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INHERENT CONFLICT: A CASE AGAINST THE USE
OF CONTINGENCY FEES BY SPECIAL ASSISTANTS IN
QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL PROSECUTORIAL ROLES
Question: If on election day you were asked to chose [sic] between
a political candidate who promised to work for a reasonable salary,
and another candidate who wanted to be paid 25% of the govern-
ment's revenues, an amount which could reach billions of dollars,
which candidate would you vote for?1
INTRODUCTION
The response to this question appears to be obvious. Why would
anyone choose to elect a government official whose compensation
would be based upon a percentage of the government's revenues?
Unfortunately, for many citizens this scenario is a reality. Although
an elected official is not personally collecting a percentage of the gov-
ernment's revenue, government officers, acting on behalf of the State
Attorneys General, are charging the taxpayers a percentage of their
courtroom winnings. Across the fifty states, the offices of the Attor-
neys General have been hiring private attorneys on contingency fee
contracts in order to act as temporary employees of the government. 2
Although it was never intended, the states have placed the power of
the Attorneys General into the hands of private attorneys, who are
motivated to prosecute on behalf of the state because they have a pe-
cuniary interest in every lawsuit that is filed.3 Unfortunately, the prin-
ciples inherent within the offices of the Attorneys General are
incompatible with such a scenario.4
Unlike private attorneys, the Attorneys General are not attorneys
in the normal sense of the term. 5 In contrast to any other attorney in
1. Amy Moritz Ridenour, Government Use of Contingency Fee Lawyers Works Against Public
Interest, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (visited Jan. 28, 2000) http://
www.reagan.com/HotTopics.main/HotMike/document-12.16.1997.3.html.
2. See infra notes 220-236 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 237-260 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 266-298 and accompanying text.
5. "Attorney at law" is defined as a "[pierson admitted to the practice of law in his respective
state and authorized to perform both civil and criminal legal functions for clients." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 128 (6th ed. 1990). "Attorney General" is defined as the "chief law officer of
the state." Id. at 129. See also, In re Estate of Stern, 608 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(stating that the Attorney General is the sole officer authorized to represent the People of Illi-
nois in any litigation in which the People of the State are the real party in interest); Miller v.
State, 33 IIl. Ct. Cl. 144, 146 (1980) (citing to Fergus v. Russell, holding that the Attorney Gen-
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private practice, the Attorneys General are instilled with a higher
public duty and obligation.6 For example, on the first day of his ad-
ministration, the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is required
to stand before the Governor of Illinois, raise his right hand, and state,
"I do solemnly swear, that I will support the [C]onstitution of the
United States and the [C]onstitution of the state of Illinois, and that I
will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of [A]ttorney
[G]eneral, according to the best of my ability."'7 Reciting the oath of
office on the day of inauguration is the formal procedure that binds
the Attorney General to the people of the state.8 Through the process
of a popular election, the people entrust the Attorney General to re-
present the citizens and interests of the State of Illinois. "The Attor-
ney General is the chief legal officer of the State; that is, he or she is
'the law officer of the people, as represented in the State government,
and its only legal representative in the courts."' 9
In each state, Attorneys General are given unique and broad pow-
ers that no other state officials possess.10 In fact, the office "occupies
eral is the sole representative of the various State offices and agencies); Arcole Constr. Co. v.
State, 11111. Ct. Cl. 423, 437 (1941) (finding that the Attorney General is the sole representative
of the People in litigation in which the State is a party and has the sole power and right to
control and conduct such litigation for the State).
6. The United States Supreme Court has stated that an attorney for the state "is the represen-
tative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
7. Illinois Attorney General Act, 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANNJ. 205/1 (West 1996).
8. In addition to the oath of office, the Attorney General is required to execute a bond in the
amount of $10,000 payable to the "People of the State of Illinois." 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
205/1 (West 1996) (emphasis added). The Illinois statute requires that "[t]he bond shall be con-
ditioned upon faithful discharge of the duties of the office." Id.
9. E.P.A. v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (citing the seminal
case of Fergus v. Russell, 110 N.E.2d 130, 144 (1915)) (emphasis added).
10. See Dave Frohnmayer, Foreword, in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL,
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS AND RESPONSIBILrTIES vii (Lynne M. Ross ed. 1990)
[hereinafter STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL]. The office of the Attorney General is unique be-
cause it is within the executive branch of state government, but also assumes a quasi-legislative
and judicial role. Although the responsibilities of the office vary between states, a broad
description of the Attorneys General include, "providing informal legal advice and formal legal
opinions to the governor and other state officials and agencies and sometimes the legislature;
representing the state, state agencies, and state officers in litigation; enforcing state civil and
criminal law; and supervising local prosecutors in some states." See Scott M. Matheson, Jr.,
Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 FLA. J. LAW & PuB. POLIcY 3
(1993). As is further discussed below, many Attorneys General continue to possess common law
powers, thereby granting them a source of authority which extends beyond the limited statutory
powers that most other state officials possess. See infra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
Some courts have held that the common law powers of the office enable the Attorney General
to "exercise all such authority as the public interest requires." Florida ex. rel. Shevin v. Exxon
Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1976). The ability to act with lawful authority in situations
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the middle of a well-traveled intersection of law, politics, and public
policy, delicately, sometimes even perilously, poised between the ten-
sions of scholarship and activism; professional responsibility and pub-
lic duty; political conflict and the search for legal certainty."' 1 In the
maze of Attorney General activities, it is difficult to ascertain the offi-
cial duties of the office. "The job description for the office of Attor-
ney General continues to evolve, since much government decision
making calls on the state Attorney General to help resolve numerous
cutting-edge legal and policy decisions that affect the lives of state
citizens.'12
The awesome duties of the State Attorneys General can at times
exhaust the resources of the office. 13 Therefore, most states provide
the office with the power to temporarily expand its resources by seek-
ing assistance outside of the regular government channels.14 This
power includes the ability to appoint special counsel,' 5 generally
known as Special Assistant Attorneys General (Special Assistant),
which allows the office to undertake efforts that would normally be
beyond its capacity.16 A Special Assistant is nothing more than a pri-
vate attorney selected to act with the powers of the Attorney Gen-
eral's office for the duration of a case or a specific time period.' 7
Throughout history, the Attorneys General have utilized this power of
appointment to help expand the reach of its office.' 8
Private attorneys acting as Special Assistants are entitled to com-
pensation for their time and effort.' 9 Traditionally, the compensation
for the services of a Special Assistant was based on an amount compa-
which the "public interest requires," is obviously a very broad and unique characteristic of the
Attorney General. Id.
11. Dave Frohnmayer, STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at vii.
12. Id. at ix.
13. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
15. The power to appoint special attorneys is an authority that every Attorney General pos-
sessed under English common law; however, a minority of states have held that the common law
powers of the Attorney General are not integrated within the office. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text. Therefore, this authority, while inherent in each state, has been denied by
some state statutes. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
17. Under Illinois statute, "the attorney so appointed shall have the same power and authority
... as the [A]ttorney [G]eneral would have had if present and attending to the same." 15 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/6 (West 1996).
18. During the early common law of England, the Attorney General's appointment power of
Special Assistants enabled the King to place his representatives in courts throughout England.
See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. In modern times, the Attorney General has used
this appointment power to create additional temporary resources and to eliminate conflicts of
interest within the office. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
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rable to the salary of full time Assistant Attorneys General, or a com-
parable "reasonable" hourly amount.20 However, this traditional
form of compensation has recently been replaced by the increasing
use of contingency fee contracts between the offices of the Attorneys
General and the private attorneys hired as Special Assistants.21
Rather than using the role of the Special Assistant to act as an impar-
tial advocate for the people of the state, private attorneys have re-
turned to their roots by taking on cases with a personal financial stake
in the outcome. 22
The decision of the State Attorneys General to commence litigation
against consumer product manufacturers is a weighty task and re-
quires a significant dedication of both human and economic re-
sources. 23 Within the past few years, Special Assistants, working on
the basis of contingency fee contracts, have participated in state spon-
sored suits against consumer product manufacturers such as the to-
bacco industry,24 manufacturers of guns, 25 lead paint,26 asbestos, 27 and
HMOs. 28 Such dedication of resources has proven to be beyond the
capacity of many State Attorneys General. 29 However, this situation
presents a problem when the role of the Attorney General is being
played by private attorneys who pursue cases, not as neutral advocates
attempting to litigate the best possible outcome for the state, but
rather as partial parties motivated by the prospect of large
settlements.30
Part II of this Comment will examine the evolution of the offices of
the State Attorneys General from its common law roots in England to
discover the extent and scope of power that was retained by the of-
20. See infra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 237-260 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 237-260 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 237-260 and accompanying text.
25. See Suro, infra note 386.
26. See United States Chamber of Commerce, infra note 389.
27. See infra notes 251, 343 and accompanying text.
28. See Hanna, infra note 387.
29. See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 295-298 and accompanying text. The author recognizes that the argument
could be made that any attorney representing a client under a contingency fee, regardless if that
client is a private individual or a state government, is motivated by the prospect of money rather
than the welfare of his client. However, the purpose of this Comment is not to attack the use of
contingency fee contracts; the author concedes that contingency fees in the private sector serve
an important purpose to the American legal system. See infra notes 299-303 and accompanying
text. The use of contingency fee contracts in the context of government actions, however, is a
very different issue. See infra notes 266-268 and accompanying text.
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fice. 31 Since the power of the Attorney General to appoint Special
Assistants is questionable, it is necessary to explore the historical be-
ginnings of the office of the Attorney General. Part II will also nar-
row the analysis of the State Attorneys General to the boundaries of
the sovereign state of Illinois in order to examine how the power to
appoint Special Assistants evolved within one jurisdiction. 32 Al-
though each office of the State Attorneys General evolved from com-
mon law, state constitutions and state statutes have modified the
specific powers available to each office.33 Accordingly, reference will
be made to other State Attorneys General in order to compare and
contrast the offices. Additionally, Part II will answer the important
question of whether the Illinois State Attorney General possesses au-
thority to appoint and compensate Special Assistants through the use
of contingency fee contracts. 34
Part III will examine the role that Special Assistants have played in
recent state sponsored suits against the tobacco industry.35 This Part
will illustrate that the method for choosing Special Assistants for the
billion-dollar tobacco litigation was not an objective and neutral selec-
tion process, but rather a tainted political process corrupted by influ-
ence, patronage, and money.36 Furthermore, Part III will pose the
question of whether the use of Special Assistants and contingency fee
contracts is proper in state sponsored litigation.37 Part IV will argue
that the use of contingency fee contracts conflicts with the goals of the
office of the State Attorneys General.38 Based on the idea that the
Attorneys General are the representatives of the people, allowing an
employee of the office to receive a great windfall as a result of his
duty to the state, is in conflict with the purpose of the office. 39 Part IV
will also examine how other jurisdictions, opposed to the use of con-
31. See infra notes 42-68 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 206-218 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 142-154 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text. In Minnesota, Michael Ciresi, the special
assistant appointed to handle the tobacco litigation, was entitled to net over $1.5 billion on be-
half of his firm. See infra note 203. He has reportedly nullified his contingency fee contract with
the state of Minnesota and will now receive an undisclosed amount directly from the tobacco
industry. See id. Furthermore, in Texas, Florida, and Mississippi, the Special Assistants will re-
ceive over $8.2 billion, about a quarter of the entire settlement amount, for their efforts on the
cases. See id. The Special Assistants in Florida are set to receive an amount that if calculated
hourly comes to $7,716 per hour if every lawyer billed 24 hours a day, every day, during the 42
months they managed the case. See infra note 220.
35. See infra notes 230-260 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 238-257 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 238-257 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 281-315 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 281-298 and accompanying text.
2000]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:743
tingency fee contracts in the government context, have attempted to
constrain the power of their State Attorneys General.4 0 In conclusion,
Part V will explore industries across America that have now become
the target of plaintiff's lawyers acting under the guise of Special As-
sistants and the future of Attorney General sponsored contingency fee
contracts.41
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law Evolution of the Attorney General
Similar to the many elements of law in the United States, the office
of the Attorney General emerged from the evolution of English com-
mon law.42 Distinct from English law, however, the American system
has two levels of Attorneys General, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral and fifty State Attorneys General.4 3 Unlike the United States
Attorney General, which was created expressly by statute,44 the State
Attorneys General are the direct descendents of the English Attorney
General;45 however, their powers and duties do not extend beyond the
sovereignty of their respective states.4 6
The Attorney General in each state shares a common point of ori-
gin with England and the original American colonies. 47 However,
40. See infra notes 338-352 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 384-391 and accompanying text.
42. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 3-14; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 11 (1971) [hereinafter OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL].
43. The focus of this Comment is the State Attorneys General of the fifty states, not the
United States Attorney General. The United States Attorney General is mentioned merely to
recognize that both offices have a similar origin in English common law. However, only the
State Attorneys General are the direct descendents of the English Attorney General. See infra
notes 92-102. When England established colonies in North America, each colony soon devel-
oped an Attorney General to act in similar fashion to the English Attorney General. See infra
notes 92-102. The United States Attorney General was not created until after the successful
resolution of the American War for Independence and subsequent adoption of the United States
Constitution. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 10. The United States Attor-
ney General was expressly created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and was therefore a product of
the newly independent United States. See id. Although the United States Attorney General
possesses the same name as it did in England, the duties of the office are controlled by congres-
sional enactments and not the evolution of the common law. See id. The office of the United
States Attorney General has no control over the state Attorneys General and vice versa. See id.
at 11. See generally Luther A. Huston, History of the Office of the Attorney General, in ROLES
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1-34 (1968) (describing the history and powers of the United
States Attorney General).
44. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 10.
45. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
47. As is further explained below, the State Attorneys General are the direct descendants of
the Attorney General in England. The office was not a unique idea created in the United States,
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since each state is a sovereign power, each possesses the authority to
create its own state laws. As a result, some states have modified the
office of the Attorney General by either adding to or subtracting from
the authority granted under the common law.48 Further, some states
have even chosen to deny the office of the Attorney General all of its
common law powers and to restrict it to state statutes. 49
Today, the offices of the State Attorneys General gain their author-
ity from a combination of state constitutions, statutory enactments,
and the common law.5 0 While most states agree that the Attorney
General's primary duty is to act as an attorney for all citizens of the
state, other states believe that the Attorney General's duty is to the
state government.51 Therefore, the power of the Attorney General in
one state can be very different from that of another state. Regardless
of the modifications that each state may have made to the office, most
Attorneys General have retained their common law powers.52 Im-
plicit within these powers is the Attorney General's authority to ap-
point Special Assistants.5 3 This authority was created in England and
handed down to the states through the common law. 54
1. The Creation of the Attorney General in England
The term "Attorney General" was not used until late in England's
history.55 During the Middle Ages, many of the duties now assumed
by the Attorney General were performed by attorneys, serjeants, and
solicitors of the King.56 These officers were temporary representa-
tives of the King and were used for limited purposes.57 "Prior to the
13th Century, the King appointed [S]pecial [A]ttorneys to prosecute
criminal cases. These counsels had limited authority and were em-
but rather was borrowed from England by the early settlers and colonists. See TIm NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,
COMMON LAW POWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 7 (1975) [hereinafter COMMON LAW
POWERS].
48. Id. at 12.
49. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text. In England, the Attorney General was the
representative of the sovereign King. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 7; see also
infra note 71 and accompanying text. However, when the United States established a republican
system rather than a monarchy, the authority of the Attorney General shifted from the King to
the People of the sovereign state. See infra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 120-154 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 120-154 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 120-154 and accompanying text.
55. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 7.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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powered to represent the Crown in a specified court for a specified
period of time."'58 Historical records from England show that the
courts used the term attornatus regis59 when making reference to an
attorney who appeared on behalf of the King.60 Although the King
made use of various persons to represent his interests, the system
lacked a central figure of authority:61
Although the Sovereign [was] in theory the fountain of justice and
supreme, the Year Books (official records) are replete with cases in
which the King was concerned as a litigant in his own courts and,
presumably abided by the decisions reached by the royal justices.
For the King to appear in person as a plaintiff or defendant in such
suit was inconceivable. The right of any person to come forward in
court and to sue on behalf of the King in any matter affecting the
King's interests was repeatedly recognised [sic] by the courts ....
As a method of protecting the King's rights, however, this unlimited
right of audience could only be regarded, at best, as somewhat
unreliable. 62
The King's unreliable system of temporary representatives eventu-
ally gave way to a more centralized office. The King's first permanent
representative appeared in 1254 when Lawrence del Brok, referred to
as the sequitur pro rege,63 appeared in court on behalf of the Crown.64
In many subsequent cases, Lawrence del Brok retained the same title
and is often recognized as the first person designated by the King to
act as a permanent attorney on the King's Bench.65 Although 1254 is
the first recorded date of Lawrence del Brok's appearance, other stud-
ies have suggested that del Brok acted on behalf of the King as early
as 1247.66
Although the King had designated a permanent sequitur pro rege,
numerous temporary attornati regis appeared throughout England
during the late Thirteenth Century. However, these representatives
were generally granted limited powers with respect to the specific
58. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 7 (citing Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal
Attorney General: The Attorney General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 304 (1958)). See generally ALAN HARDI G, SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1966)
(stating that the adjudication of claims are dependent on the counsel's knowledge of his assigned
court).
59. Attornatus regis, translated from Latin means "the King's counsel (official body)." CAS-
SELL'S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY 509 (1960).
60. See Hugh C. Bellott, The Origin of the Attorney-General, 25 LAW Q. REv. 400,407 (1909).
61. See JOHN LLEWELYN JONES EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN 15 (1964).
62. Id.
63. Sequitur pro rege translated from Latin means "to follow, come after, or accompany on
behalf of or for the king." See CASSELL'S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 549.
64. See Bellott, supra note 60, at 406.
65. Id.
66. See EDWARDS, supra note 61, at 15 (citing later studies of Professor Sayles).
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courts and the matters over which they had authority. 67 As time
passed, these numerous attorneys and solicitors were consolidated
into one office. Historians differ as to when the first Attorney Gen-
eral was appointed, some believe that John Herbert was appointed to
the position in 1461.68 Nonetheless, others claim that William Husse
became the first Attorney General of England in 1472.69 Although
most historians support the latter finding, it has been commented that:
The fixing of dates is often an idle pursuit where the progress of
historical development is concerned. This is particularly true of En-
glish History. There is no need, therefore to pronounce with cer-
tainty that so-and-so was the first Attorney General, or that the
office was instituted in such a year, even if this were possible. His-
torically, the office has no statutory basis. The Attorney General
and the Solicitor-General are the products of royal need. These of-
fices emanate from the magnitude of the royal business in the
Courts. For this the King, like everyone else must have representa-
tives to match the proctor in the ecclesiastical courts. Little by little
the Law Officers are drawn into the great constitutional struggles of
Tudor and Stuart times, and when these are at last ended, the Law
Officers emerge, firmly attached to the King's Cabinet Council,
whose development has made possible our modern Parliamentary
system. 70
As the office of the Attorney General evolved, the powers of the
King's attorneys and solicitors were slowly absorbed by the Attorney
General, until only the Attorney General existed as the representative
of the sovereign King.71 Regardless of the exact date, it is clear that
by the end of the Fifteenth Century the King had created an Attorney
General with the power to appoint deputies to act on the King's be-
half in any court of record.72
2. Powers of the English Attorney General
Although the original duties of the Attorney General were rather
broad, the actual power of the position was limited. Since the Attor-
ney General began merely as the "King's Attorney,' 73 he was respon-
67. The appointment of these attorneys did not create a broad authority to represent the
King; rather, the appointed attorneys were assigned to a specific court in England, typically a
region that was too difficult or burdensome to require travel by the sequitur pro rege, and for a
specific purpose, such as the collection of taxes. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 8.
As the attorneys with limited power completed their assignments, they were replaced by a single
attorney who possessed much broader powers. Id.
68. See EDWARDS, supra note 61, at 26.
69. See Bellott, supra note 60, at 410-11.
70. George W. Keeton, The Office of Attorney General, 58 JURID. REV. 107, 217 (1946).
71. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 7.
72. See id.
73. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 4.
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sible for any and all duties that the King would direct. Therefore, all
authority belonged to the King, and the Attorney General had little
authority of his own.74 The actual duties of the first King's Attorney
included:
initiating actions to recover rents and lands, proceeding against
those who pronounced a sentence of excommunication against a
royal servant, guarding the King's right to present to churches, in-
vestigating homicides to hear and determine what pertained to the
Crown, and, on one occasion, engaging in a special mission to dis-
cover the marriages, wards, reliefs, and other royal rights which had
been conceded or alienated within a particular township since the
time of King John's coronation. 75
History has shown that the duties of the early Attorney General
were fairly broad. He was authorized to "protect state property, em-
ployees, and exercises of official discretion; to prosecute serious crimi-
nal cases; and to commence special investigations. '76 However, these
powers could only be exercised through the authority of the King "at
the direction of state executive authority. '77
In 1461, the Attorney General accumulated additional powers that
began to grant the office more autonomy. "In that year, the Crown
authorized the King's Attorney to appoint subordinates to carry out
the attorney's responsibilities; [and] appointed a King's Attorney to a
life tenure position. ' 78 Although the Attorney General's life tenure
and ability to appoint additional attorneys increased the power of the
office, its position continued to be closely connected and controlled by
the King.79
During the reign of King Henry III, the duties of the Attorney Gen-
eral further expanded as it began to assume political duties beyond its
typical role in the King's courts. In the early 1500s, the King utilized
the Attorney General as a liaison between the House of Lords and the
House of Commons. 8° "The Attorney General, who served the Lords,
in effect as an assistant, '[carried] bills and messages from the Lords to
the Commons, and [drafted] or [amended] government bills before
and during their passage through Parliament.'"
8
74. See id.
75. EDWARDS, supra note 61, at 16.
76. STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 5. This granting of power by the King is now recognized as the birthplace of modem
American Attorneys General's power to appoint Special Assistants. See id.
79. See id.
80. See EDWARDS, supra note 61, at 34.
81. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 5 (quoting EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS
OF THE CROWN 34 (1964)). This novel use of the Attorney General was significant because the
[Vol. 50:743
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The nature of the Attorney General's service to the House of Lords
was altered when, in 1670, Sir Heneage Finch was appointed Attorney
General.82 Aside from being appointed as the new Attorney General,
Sir Heneage Finch was also an elected member of the House of Com-
mons. 83 Finch was permitted to retain his seat in the House of Com-
mons as well as perform the duties of the Attorney General.84
Therefore, the Attorney General "played an active role in presenting
Commons' cases to the Lords .... Thus, by the early 1700s, the At-
torney General's role had evolved from an assistant to the Lords to an
advocate of Commons as an elected Member of Commons. '8 5
By the Sixteenth Century, the Attorney General had become not
only the chief representative of the King and all his courts, but also
the most important person in the legal department of the state.86 Dur-
ing the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries, the office of
the Attorney General began to assume political overtones. As the
constitutional differences between the King and Parliament grew,8 7
the King required an office of lawyers "who were conversant with the
political problems of the day."'8 8 As English law developed, the office
of the Attorney General "emerged as the legal advisor for the govern-
ment, not just as the single servant of the King." 89 The Attorney Gen-
duties of the office extended into the legislature. Prior to this point, the Attorney General had
only been utilized for executive functions. However, the Attorney General was now extending
his authority and influence into the legislature, marking the beginning of the Attorney General's
ability to expand his duties and responsibilities beyond the judicial or executive branches of
government. Id.
82. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 5.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See William S. Holdsworth, The Early History of the Attorney and Solicitor General, 13
ILL. L. REv. 602, 608 (1919).
87. Many of the constitutional difficulties between King George III and Parliament developed
around the imminent revolution in the American colonies. See COMMON LAW POWERS supra
note 47, at 10. During this time, the King attempted to fill the courts and government offices
with attorneys loyal to the English common law, the system of law that recognized judge-made
law as the rule of law in England. Id at 9. Parliament, on the other hand, sought practitioners
educated in the Roman civil law, who believed the rule of law was that which was codified in
legislative enactments. Id.
88. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 9. When the King began his use of the Attorney
General, the office needed only to be filled by someone who could execute simple matters in an
English court, such as the collection of taxes. Id. However, due to the emerging political debate
between the King and Parliament, the King now required a staff of attorneys who would not
only represent the King in court, but also advise and counsel him on the important political and
legal issues of the time. Since the King was only one man, in a battle of works and ideas with the
many members of Parliament, the King found it wise to surround himself with many of his
educated loyalists in an attempt to even the odds. Id.
89. Id. at 10.
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eral "appeared on behalf of the Crown in the courts, gave legal advice
to all the departments of the government and appeared for them in
courts whenever they wished ... [h]e became an adviser to the gov-
ernment as a whole; the Attorney General for the Crown." 90
Although the Attorney General began as a mere attorney for the
King, it expanded into an intricate political and governmental office.
The Attorney General became involved in the important matters of
the state and began to establish authority away from the Crown. "The
Attorney General thereby, over time, became less the King's lawyer'
and more a public official responsible for justice. This trend in
[E]ighteenth [C]entury England continued to develop in the Ameri-
can colonies." 91
3. The Attorney General in Colonial America
The early English colonists brought the office of the Attorney Gen-
eral with them when they traveled to the New World. Although his-
torical records show that Attorneys General were present in America,
the records are unclear about whether they were given power through
a royal decree or by parliament. 92 The colonists generally accepted
that the Attorneys General were delegates of the Attorney General in
England and that they generally possessed the same common law
powers, except as modified by colonial statutes. 93
It is evident that Attorneys General were present soon after the
colonists settled in the New World, however, "[t]he first recorded ap-
pointment of an Attorney General in the New World was that of
90. Id.
91. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 6.
92. Historians are unclear as to how the office of the Attorney General was transferred to the
New World. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 10. The emergence of Attorneys
General in the New World may have been nothing more than a mere recognition by the colonists
that English law, and therefore all elements of English law, including the Attorney General,
continued to be the controlling rules in the New World. Id. However, the colonists also recog-
nized that the English Attorney General was too distant from any of the events in the New
World to have any true understanding or ability to assist with the potential legal difficulties of
the colonies. Id. Therefore, each colony took it upon itself to select a local Attorney General
who would address the issues within that colony under the same rule of English laws and princi-
ples. Id.
93. See generally OLIVER W. HAMMONDS, Tim ATrORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COL-
ONIES, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, Series V.1, no.3 (1939) (discussing the first Attor-
neys General in the colonies). Since the colonists had been living with an Attorney General in
England, they had no reason to contest or question the continued use of the office in the New
World. The New World was intended to be an English colony, ruled under English law, there-
fore, the colonists had no reason to believe that the duties and responsibilities of the office were
to be any different than its counterpart in England. Id.
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Richard Lee in Virginia in 1643,"' 94 and the first printed record of an
American Attorney General appeared in a Maryland criminal statute
in 1658. 95 Although the office was present in the New World, the ex-
act powers and duties of the office are unclear. Historians have recog-
nized that the office of the Attorney General in the New World was
severely disadvantaged due to the limited resources and poorly speci-
fied duties of the office. 96 Since the actual duties of the office were
described in the complex rulings of the common law, and because
most of "those versed in the common law were far away in En-
gland," 97 the office of the Attorney General in the New World began
to take on a "wide variety of duties [that] allowed [the] office to de-
velop differently from colony to colony. '98
In the year 1660, the Lord Proprietor of Maryland issued a commis-
sion which stated that the colonial Attorney General should act "in all
Causes as well as Criminall and Civill to sue poursue prosecute and
Implead and in our name on Suits against us Commenced to answere
94. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 6.
95. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 10. Mentioning the Attorney General within a
statute provides us with clear evidence that the office was in existence and being utilized by the
colonies. More important, however, is recognizing that this first mention of the office did not
create the office, but merely added to its responsibilities. As we attempt to look back into his-
tory we wonder how the colonists knew to appoint an Attorney General, what authority to use
for such an appointment, and how to enumerate the responsibilities of the office. Such a formal
approach to this question by historians and scholars will not, and in fact has not, enabled us to
discover an answer. A better analysis is to recall that the early colonists were more focused on
survival in the New World than on formal legal requirements. Id. When the colonies had suffi-
ciently established an organized society in which legal questions began to arise, they looked to
England and imported the Attorney General. Id. The colonists began to make use of the Attor-
ney General in order to solve the legal issues that were unique to the American Colonies. Many
years passed before the colonists found it necessary to memorialize their use of the Attorney
General into a written statute. Id. However, the lack of a written record on the activities of the
Attorney General does not imply that the office did not exist. Rather it suggests that the colo-
nists believed it to be such an inherent part of their new society that there was no need to record
its beginning. Effectively, the office of the Attorney General in the New World never began, it
merely continued from its long prior history in England.
96. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 6.
97. Id.
98. Id. The legal questions and issues that the Attorney General in England addressed were
quite different from the matters requiring attention in the New World. While the English Attor-
ney General may have been dealing with questions of constitutional law in Parliament, the At-
torney Generals within the colonies were utilized for the purposes of prosecuting crime and
maintaining order. Id. at 6-7. Each colony experienced its own issues and therefore used the
Attorneys General to address its own set of problems. As a result, each of the Attorneys Gen-
eral within the colonies began to evolve in a different direction based on the specific needs of the
colony. Although each Attorney General shared a common origin, they quickly diverged into
separate and unique officers of their respective colonies. Id.
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as fully and amply as an Attorney General many doe." 99 Although
most colonies received similar commissions, the duties of the Attor-
ney General continued to develop uniquely within each colony.
Pennsylvania provides an example of a colony that developed the
office of the Attorney General based on its own individual needs and
ideals. Due to the diversity of the early population in the Penn-
sylvania colony, the office of the Attorney General embodied many
different elements of law. The office was created through the "statu-
tory laws of Sweden and the Netherlands, Roman law, Delaware In-
dian law, colonial and proprietary laws, the laws of the Duke of York,
the egalitarian principles of the Quakers, and traditional English com-
mon law."'' 0° While the colonial Pennsylvania Attorney General ac-
knowledged that it was a representative of the state, the office
"opposed the governor on numerous occasions on behalf of the citi-
zens of the colony." 10 1 This opposition marked an early shift in focus
as "the office of the Attorney [G]eneral in colonial Pennsylvania be-
came not only the advocate of the royal or executive interest, as it had
been in England, but also the legal defender of the public interest and
the rights of individual citizens. ' 10 2
4. From Colony to Statehood: The State Attorneys General in the
United States
When the American colonies asserted their independence from En-
gland, the offices of the Attorneys General were permanently severed
from the common law of England and went on to begin a second gen-
eration of common law evolution under the American system.10 3 As a
99. HAMMONDS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 3-4 (1 Anglo-Amer-
ican Legal History Series No. 2, 1939).
100. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 8. New York was another example of a
colony with influences other than English law. New York was first settled as New Amsterdam
by the Dutch and did not come under English control until 1674; thereafter, the colony still
contained elements of Dutch society and culture. Id. at 6-8.
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id.
103. Although American common law is now severed from that of England, it is interesting to
examine the duties of the Attorney General as it exists in present day England. The modern
Attorney General in England continues to serve the King; however, the office has become much
more of a guardian of the public interest, and is generally involved in all matters of public inter-
est. See Attorney General ex rel. McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, 1 Q.B. 629
(Law Reports) (1973), Attorney-General v. Times Newspaper Ltd., 3 All E.R. 54 (1973). In The
Law Officers of the Crown, Professor Edwards commented:
First, there is the Attorney General's position as the Crown's principal agent for en-
forcing public legal rights .... Generally referred to as relator actions, proceedings are
brought in the name of the Attorney General with the object, for example, of obtaining
a declaration or an injunction (1) in cases of public nuisance, (2) with a view to re-
straining a corporation from exceeding the legal powers conferred upon it by statute,
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result of the American Revolution, the offices of the Attorneys Gen-
eral were free to evolve independently of the Attorney General in
England. Each office utilized its newfound independence to develop
its role as an important part of American jurisprudence.
The presence of seven delegates at the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia in 1787, whom had already been or would soon serve
as Attorneys General in their respective state or colony, marked the
beginning of the Attorney General's importance in the new United
States. 1° Many states created the office of the Attorney General
through their constitutions in one form or another. "Thirty-four of
the fifty, either continued or created the office of the Attorney Gen-
eral with their first constitutions. Eight other states established the
office by law at the time of statehood.' 10 5 Today, each of the fifty
United States has created an office of the Attorney General. 106
5. Source of Attorney General's Power in America
Even though the English Attorney General derived his power from
the King, 107 the United States established a representative democracy.
Thus, there is a debate among state courts as to where the office of the
American Attorney General derived its power. For example, cases in
American courts have generally "held that the Attorney General's
common law powers derive from his role as representative of the peo-
ple, not of state government."' 08 In Commonwealth v. Paxton,10 9 a
where the excess of power tends to injure the public, or (3) to prevent the repeated
commission of a statutory offense by any person. These aspects of the Attorney-Gen-
eral's role as protector of public rights are of great antiquity. Quite distinct is the mod-
em participation by successive holders of the office of Attorney General who have
deemed it their duty ... to represent the public interest before public tribunals.
EDWARDS, supra note 61, at 286.
104. Those delegates who served in the office of the Attorney General were: William Paterson
of New Jersey; John Rutledge of South Carolina; Gunning Bedford, Jr., and George Read, both
of Delaware; Jarod Ingersoll of Pennsylvania; Luther Martin of Maryland; and Edmund Ran-
dolph of Virginia. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 11-12. Considering that
current and former Attorneys General assisted in the drafting and passage of the United States
Constitution, the office of the Attorneys General served a role in state government that was far
beyond the mere collection of taxes or prosecution of simple crimes. With their presence at the
Constitutional Convention, the Attorneys General of the United States started a program of
public advocacy that continues today. Id.
105. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10, at 11-12
106. Aside from the fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the North-
ern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands each have an office of the Attor-
ney General, or at least provide for a chief legal officer. See id. at 8.
107. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
108. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 15.
109. 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974).
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Kentucky court found that the office of the Attorney General gains its
power from the people 110 and reasoned that:
It is true that at common law the duty of the Attorney General was
to represent the King, he being the embodiment of the state. But
under the democratic form of government now prevailing the peo-
ple are the king, so the Attorney General's duties are to that sover-
eign rather than to the machinery of government."1
A similar question arose in the California case, D'Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners.112 In D'Amico, the plaintiffs claimed that the
Attorney General's representation of a licensing board conflicted with
his duty to represent the public interest." 3 The California court
agreed and held that the Attorney General's duty to represent the
people was paramount where it conflicted with the representation of a
state agency or officer." 4
The notion that the Attorney General represents the people first
and the state second is not a uniform idea throughout the fifty states.
For example, "Arizona is one of the few jurisdictions to deny the At-
torney General authority to act in the public interest. ."... ,115 In Ari-
zona State Land Development v. McFate,116 the Arizona Supreme
Court held that the Attorney General's duty is to represent the state
as its chief legal advisor and "the initiation of litigation by the
[A]ttorney [G]eneral in furtherance of interests of the public gener-
ally, as distinguished from policies or practices of a particular depart-
ment, is not a concomitant function of this role.""17 The court further
explained that "the [A]ttorney [G]eneral in Arizona is thus greatly
restricted in his ability to institute actions which he may deem to be in
the public interest .... The decision to oppose the official determina-
tion of a state agency would, then, rest only in the Governor.""
' 8
Aside from Arizona, most states have directed the office of the Attor-
ney General to serve the people of the state." 9
110. See id. at 868 (holding that the Attorney General's primary obligation is to the state as a
body politic rather than any particular state agency or officer).
111. Id. at 867 (citations omitted).
112. 520 P.2d 10, 20 (Cal. 1974) (finding that the Attorney General is charged with represent-
ing the interests of the people in any matter of public concern).
113. See id. at 19.
114. See id. at 20.
115. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 15.
116. 348 P.2d. 912 (Ariz. 1960).
117. Id. at 915.
118. Id. at 915. See Howard N. Singer, Note, State Officers-Attorney General-Right to Insti-
tute Action Against a State Agency, 2 ARiz. L. REv. 293, 295 (1960) (discussing how law enforce-
ment is impeded when the Attorney General's power is restricted).
119. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 15.
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6. Powers of the Attorney General in America
The various offices of the State Attorneys General derive their
power from several sources, including English common law, American
common law, state constitutions, and state legislative actions.120 As a
result of the variety of sources, it is difficult to create a list of the
possible powers that an Attorney General might possess. Powers aris-
ing from state constitutions or legislative enactments are fairly easy to
discover because of the express language indicating a presence or ab-
sence of authority. Nonetheless, the common law represents a con-
cept with which American courts continue to struggle.
Many courts have attempted to grasp, albeit unsuccessfully, the
breadth of the common law. Some have defined the common law as
"the common jurisprudence of the people of the United States ...
[which was] brought with them as colonists from England, and estab-
lished here so far as it was adapted to our institutions and circum-
stances.'' 1 Other courts have concluded that the common law is "a
few broad and comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural
justice, and enlightened public policy."'1 22 Yet, others classify it as
"not a static but a dynamic and growing thing ... [with rules] arising
from application of reason to the changing condition of society.' 23
While all courts have a general understanding of the concept of com-
mon law, none have pinpointed an exact meaning of the term.
As a result of the confusion regarding the meaning of "common
law," the exact duties of the office of the Attorney General in
America remain unclear. Although the English common law was the
source of the office's power, no clear guide existed as to the extent of
the office's duties. The duties of the American Attorney General
were so vague that it left each office struggling to define its position.
In fact,
[t]he colonial archives reveal that [the Attorney General] was en-
gaged in activities ranging from preparing indictments on charges of
murder, theft, mutiny, sedition and piracy, to appearing before the
grand jury, and to acting against individuals for disturbing a minister
in a divine service. He worked closely with the courts and made
recommendations to the Council, even suggesting the creation of
new courts and appointing attorneys for the county courts.'2 4
120. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
121. ARTHUR SILLS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 102 (1967).
122. Edgerly v. Barker, 31 A. 900, 905 (N.H. 1891) (quoting Norway Plains Co. v. Boston &
M.R. Co., 1 Gray 263, 267-68 (Mass. 1854)).
123. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 648 (C.C.A. Va. 1942).
124. Id.
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For example, in 1701 the Attorney General of Massachusetts com-
mented that, "I never Could know what was my duty, - What I Should
doe,. . . All other officers know their power duty & dues by the law,
but Relating to the King's Attorney the law is Silent."' 125
In 1708, South Carolina attempted to resolve the problem by defin-
ing the duties of its Attorney General.' 26 The colony specified that
the duties of the office were:
[T]o Act, Plead, Implead, Sue, and Prosecute all and every Person
& Persons whatsoever, for all Debts, Fines, Americaments, Forfeit-
ures, Escheats Claims and Demands whatsoever which now is or
may or Shall be Due in Arrears to Us upon any Account whatso-
ever whither Rents, Revenues or otherwise howsoever, And to
Prosecute all Matters Criminall as well as Civill Giving and hereby
Granting unto You full Power and Authority and the Premises
therein to Deal Doe Execute and Performe in as large and Ample
manner to all Intents and Purposes as to be Said officer of Attorney
Generall doth in any way Appertaine & bellong .... 127
Similarly, Virginia had difficulty in defining the role of the Attorney
General. "Generally, the duties of the Attorney General were to
prosecute criminal actions, handle bonds and disputed land claims,
and to represent the Commonwealth. However, in Virginia, he also
seemed to exercise a substantial degree of control and supervision
over the collection of public monies."'1 28 The Attorney General in
Virginia even assisted the House of Burgesses in the drafting of legis-
lation and was given a seat in the House even though he was not a
member. 129
The differences between the Attorney General's duties in each of
the colonies is representative of the fact that there was no one strict
definition of the position. 130 "The office was far from stable, as the
Crown or legislatures kept changing it... ." -131 Even today, there is a
lack of a uniform definition and description of the duties of the Attor-
ney General.
Discovering the powers and duties of the Attorney General in the
United States is an onerous task since it requires an analysis of not
only the English common law, but also the common law of every state.
Although many courts in the United States have agreed that the
Attorney General of the contemporary American state is endowed
125. HAMMONDS, supra note 93, at 6-7.
126. See id. at 17.
127. Id.
128. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 11.
129. See HAMMONDS, supra note 93, at 6-7.
130. See id.
131. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 11.
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with the common law powers of his English forbearer ... the appli-
cation from one jurisdiction to another of this seemingly simple
principle has produced an astonishing array of mutations which
make it altogether impossible to reach any sweeping generalization
on the matter. 132
The first American ruling on the common law powers of the Attor-
ney General was in Massachusetts in 1850. In Parker v. May,133 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Attorney Gen-
eral may exercise powers that originated from the English Attorney
General. 134 However, the New York case of People v. Miner135 is the
case most often cited for a basic list of the common law powers of the
Attorney General. 136 The court in Miner held that:
The [A]ttorney [Gleneral had the power, and it was his duty: 1st.
To prosecute all actions, necessary for the protection and defense of
the properties and revenues of the crown. 2nd. By information, to
bring certain classes of persons accused of crimes and misdemean-
ors to trial. 3rd. By scire facias,137 to revoke and annul grants made
by the crown improperly, or when forfeited by the grantee thereof.
4th. By information, to recover money or other chattels, or dam-
ages for wrongs committed on the land, or other possessions of the
crown. 5th. By writ of quo warranto,138 to determine the right of
him who claims or usurps any office, franchise or liberty, and to
vacate the charter, or annul the existence of a corporation, for viola-
tions of its charter, or for omitting to exercise its corporate powers.
6th. By writ of mandamus,139 to compel the admission of an officer
duly chosen to his office, and to compel his restoration when ille-
132. Earl DeLong, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney General in Criminal Prosecutions,
25 J. CRiM. L. 358, 392 (1934).
133. Parker v. May, 5 Cush. 336 (Mass. 1850).
134. See id. at 336.
135. 2 Lans. 396, 398 (N.Y. 1868).
136. Id. (holding in the case was that the Attorney General could not interfere with the town
commissioner's power to issue bonds even if the commissioner failed to adhere to the required
preliminary steps). The judge in the case commented, "I am utterly opposed to the adoption of a
rule that will permit a State officer to intermeddle in the affairs of every corporation in the State.
It can only lead to abuse .... Id.
137. Scire facias is defined as a "judicial writ, founded upon some matter of record, such as a
judgment or recognizance, requiring the person against whom it is brought to show cause why
the party bringing it should not have advantage of such record, or why the record should not be
anulled and vacated." See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (6th ed. 1990). The name is used to
designate both the writ and the proceeding. See id.
138. Quo warranto is defined as a "writ in the nature of a writ of right for the king, against
him who claimed or usurped any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he
supported his claim, in order to determine the right .... A common law writ designed to test
whether a person exercising power is legally entitled to do so." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1256
(6th ed. 1990).
139. Mandamus translated literally means "we command." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARv
961 (6th ed. 1990). This is a writ which issued from a court of superior jurisdiction, directed to a
private or municipal corporation, or an inferior court. It commanded the performance of a par-
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gaily ousted. 7th. By information to chancery, to enforce trusts,
and to prevent public nuisances, and the abuse of trust powers. 8th.
By proceedings in rem140 to recover property to which the crown
may be entitled, by forfeiture for treason, and property, for which
there is no other legal owner, such as wrecks, treasure trove. 9th.
And in certain cases, by information in chancery, for the protection
of the rights of lunatics, and others, who are under the protection of
the crown. 14'
The Miner court recognized that "this enumeration, probably does not
embrace all the powers of the [A]ttorneys [G]eneral at common
law."1 42
Each state of the Union developed its own common law with re-
spect to the office of the Attorney General. In the case of Mundy v.
McDonald,143 the Michigan Supreme Court held "that the office of
Attorney General is ancient in its origin and history, and it is generally
held by the states of the Union that the Attorney General has a wide
range of powers at common law. These are in addition to his statutory
powers." 144 Although each state has the power to alter the power of
the office through legislative enactment, most states have held that the
statutory powers given to the office are in addition to the common law
powers.145
The office of Attorney General has existed from an early period,
both in England and this country, and is vested by common law with
a great variety of duties in the administration of government. The
duties are so numerous and various that it has not been the policy of
the legislature of the states of this country to attempt specifically to
enumerate them; and where the question has come up for consider-
ation, it is generally held that the office is clothed, in addition to the
duties expressly defined by statute, with all the powers pertaining
thereto under the common law.
146
ticular specified act or directed the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of which
he had been illegally deprived. See id.
140. In rein is a technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted "against the
thing," as opposed to personal actions, which are said to be in personan. See BLACK'S LAW
DlCrIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1990).
141. Miner, 2 Lans. at 396.
142. Id.
143. 185 N.W. 877 (Mich. 1921).
144. Id. at 880.
145. Each state of the Union has a seminal case that controls the common law powers and
statutory construction of the office of the Attorney General. The best listing of these cases was
published by the National Association of Attorneys General in 1975. See COMMON LAW Pow-
ERS, supra note 47, at 57-66 (citing cases from each of the fifty states involving the common law
powers of the Attorneys General).
146. 6 C.J. 809, § 12 (1916).
[Vol. 50:743
INHERENT CONFLICT
In recognizing that the power of the Attorneys General arises from
the combination of both the common law and relevant statutory law,
most jurisdictions follow the rationale from People v. Miner:
As the powers of the [A]ttorney-[G]eneral, were not conferred by
statute, a grant by statute of the same or other powers, would not
operate to deprive him of those belonging to the office at common
law, unless the statute, either expressly, or by reasonable intend-
ment, forbade the exercise of powers thus expressly conferred. 147
Therefore, unless a state statute expressly excludes the common law
powers of the office of the Attorney General, all such powers are
deemed to be inherent within the office. Today there appears to be
only seven states that deny the Attorney General its common law
powers,'148 all other states have either not addressed the issue directly
or have expressly held that the common law power continues to coex-
ist with statutory power. 1 49
While the general rule is that a state statute can remove the com-
mon law powers of the Attorney General, some states have held that
the legislature does not have the authority to abolish the common law
powers of the office.150 For example, in Massachusetts, the office of
Attorney General was abolished by the state legislature in 1843 as a
result of an effort to place all of the Attorney General's powers in
local district attorneys.151 However, in 1849, displeased with the re-
sults of its attempt to localize control, the legislature restored the of-
fice, but, in doing so, it severely restricted the power and the authority
of the office. 152 In Parker v. May, 53 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that although the abolition and subsequent reinstatement
of the office broke the continuous flow of the common law, the legis-
lature's action did not terminate the Attorney General's common law
powers, even though the new office was restricted by state statute. 154
Similarly in 1938, the Pennsylvania legislature codified the power of
the Attorney General to conduct grand jury investigations. 55 How-
ever, one year later, the statute was repealed. 156 In Appeal of Margi-
147. Miner, 2 Lans. at 396.
148. The seven states to deny the Attorney General common law powers are Arizona, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. See COMMON LAW POWERS,
supra note 47, at 20-21.
149. See id.
150. See infra notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
151. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 12.
152. See id.
153. 59 Mass. 336 (1850).
154. See id.
155. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 12.
156. See id.
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otti,157 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized the continued
existence of the Attorney General's common law power to conduct
grand jury investigations, without acknowledging the fact that the stat-
ute authorizing such power was clearly repealed by the state legisla-
ture. 58 The majority reviewed the history of the Attorney General
and concluded that the office was "clothed with the powers and attrib-
utes which enveloped Attorneys General at common law, including
the right ... to appear before the grand jury." 159 In dissent, Judge
Jones argued that since the statute giving the Attorney General its
grand jury power was repealed, the office no longer possessed the au-
thority that the statute codified.' 60 Despite this argument, the major-
ity held that the power to conduct grand jury investigations was not
rooted in the statute, but rather was an inherent power of the Attor-
ney General based in the common law and continued to exist indepen-
dent of the now repealed statute.161
The above cases from Pennsylvania and Massachusetts demonstrate
the strength of the common law within American jurisprudence.
Since the common law forms the basis of our modern legal system, it
is an inherent part of every Attorney General.162 As was previously
discussed, each state maintains its individual authority over the com-
mon law powers of the Attorneys General.163 Some states possess the
ability to modify the common law powers of the State Attorney Gen-
eral through legislative enactment. However, most states have fol-
lowed the principle stated in Miner that unless a state legislature
expressly terminates the common law powers of the Attorney Gen-
eral, it can be assumed that such powers are part of the office. 164 This
is the general rule that controls most jurisdictions in the United
States. 165 However, the State of Illinois does not subscribe to this gen-
eral rule. Illinois has expressly held that the common law power of
the Attorney General cannot be limited by state statute. 66 As a re-
157. 75 A.2d 465 (Pa. 1950).
158. See id. at 466.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 474-75 (Jones, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 466. This case clearly illustrates that the legislature cannot remove a power of
the Attorney General by codifying the authority in a statute, and later repealing that same stat-
ute. Since the power to conduct a grand jury investigation was recognized at common law, such
authority cannot be revoked without a statue which clearly prohibits the Attorney General from
exercising such a power.
162. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 169-178 and accompanying text.
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suit, the Attorney General of Illinois has perhaps the broadest power
of all the Attorneys General within the United States. 167
B. The Attorney General in Illinois
In Illinois, the office of the Attorney General was created by the
state constitution that states: "The executive department shall consist
of a[n] . . . Attorney General, who shall ... perform such duties as
may be prescribed by law.' 16 This constitutional provision created
the office, and decreed that the state legislature shall have the power
to create the duties of the office. However, Illinois is unique because
its case law has previously held that not only does the office possess all
of its common law powers, but the common law powers of the office
cannot be limited.169
In 1887, the Illinois Supreme Court gave the first indication of the
Attorney General's broad powers in Hunt v. Chicago Horse &
Dummy Ry. Company.170 In Hunt, the court held that "the duties of
such an office are so numerous and varied that it has not been the
policy of legislatures to attempt the difficult task of enumerating
them.' 171 The Illinois Supreme Court simply stated that the Attorney
General has all the authority of the common law.' 72 In 1941, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois decided People v. Finnegan,173 which perma-
nently incorporated all common law duties and powers into the office
of the Attorney General. This decision made the common law an in-
herent part of the office that could never be removed. 74 In Finnegan,
the Illinois Supreme Court specifically held:
[11n this State the constitution, by creating the office of Attorney
General under its well-known common law designation and provid-
ing that he shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the
law, ingrafted upon the office all the powers and duties of an Attor-
ney General as known at the common law and gave the General
Assembly power to confer additional powers and impose additional
duties upon him. The legislature cannot, however, strip him of any
of his common law powers and duties as the legal representative of
the State.' 75
167. See infra notes 169-178 and accompanying text.
168. ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. V, §1.
169. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
170. 13 N.E. 176, 181 (Ill. 1887).
171. See id. at 180 (holding that the Attorney General has the authority to challenge the Chi-
cago City Council decision to allow the construction of a railroad on city streets).
172. See id.
173. 38 N.E.2d 715, 716 (Ill. 1941) (holding that the Illinois legislature has no authority to
remove the common law powers of the office of the Attorney General).
174. See id.
175. Id.
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The idea that the Attorney General's common law powers cannot
be limited has been well supported by Illinois case law. In People v.
Covelli,176 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
[ilt is thus apparent that on those occasions when the Illinois courts
have had an opportunity to examine into the matter of the rights
and prerogatives of the Attorney General of the state, they have
quite generally determined that such officer, in addition to those
powers and duties conferred by statute, enjoys all the inherent pow-
ers and duties of the Attorney General of England under the com-
mon law, and that under no circumstances could those powers be
denied him.177
Illinois is the only state to expressly hold that the state legislature can-
not remove any of the common law powers of the Attorney General's
office. 178 Due to the wide range of duties and powers available at
common law, the Illinois courts have never tried to enumerate all of
the duties of the office.' 79 The publication of such a list by the Illinois
176. 112 N.E.2d 156 (11. 1953).
177. Id. at 160.
178. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 12.
179. See Hunt, 13 N.E. at 176 (adopting the reasoning of Hunt v. Chicago & Dummy Ry. Co.,
20 I11. App. 282 (1886)). The Illinois courts have refrained from creating a list enumerating the
powers and duties of the Attorney General because the list would encompass centuries of En-
glish law, early American law, as well as almost two hundred years of state law. In addition, it
has never been the courts' responsibility to draft lists which enumerate the powers and authori-
ties of a government office. Such a role traditionally belongs to the legislature. Even if such a
list were created, it could never encompass the ever-evolving nature of the common law which
creates the majority of the Attorney General's powers. Despite these limitations, the Illinois
Legislature has provided a list of the Attorney General's duties to be used as a guide. As is
evident from the broad and permissive language, this list is not intended to serve as an exclusive
or all encompassing enumeration of duties. The Illinois statute states:
[Tihe duties of the attorney general shall be - First - To appear for and represent the
people of the state before the Supreme Court in all cases in which the state or the
people of the state are interested. Notwithstanding this provision, the Office of Public
Counsel shall be authorized to represent the interests of the people of the state in all
proceedings pertinent to utility regulation, including cases before the Supreme Court,
where any such case is properly brought by the Office pursuant to its statutory duties
and powers. Second-To institute and prosecute all actions and proceedings in favor of
or for the use of the state, which may be necessary in the execution of the duties of any
state officer. Third-To defend all actions and proceedings against any state officer, in
his official capacity, in any of the courts of this state or the United States. Fourth-To
consult with and advise the several state's attorneys in matters relating to the duties of
their office; and when, in his judgment, the interest of the people of the state requires
it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and assist in the prosecution.
When the attorney general has requested in writing that a state's attorney initiate court
proceedings to enforce any provisions of The Election Code or to initiate a criminal
prosecution with respect to a violation of The Election Code, and when the state's
attorney has declined in writing to initiate those proceedings or prosecutions or when
the state's attorney has neither initiated the proceedings or prosecutions nor responded
in writing to the attorney general within 60 days of the receipt of the request, the attor-
ney general may, concurrently with or independently of the state's attorney, initiate
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courts would most likely be a futile act because the common law con-
tinues to change as time passes. 18°
Although the common law duties of the Attorney General's office
have never been enumerated, Illinois courts have held that the
"[A]ttorney [G]eneral, by virtue of the common law and statutory
powers of his office, is the legal representative of the state and may
institute proceedings in behalf of the state in any case where it has a
substantial interest."' 81 Most of the Illinois Attorney General's cases
involve representing state agencies or officers in actions around the
state, 182 pursuing consumer protection actions to safeguard citizens
from fraudulent business practices, 83 and protecting the public
against threats to health and safety. 84 In contrast to the duty to the
state government, directly inherited from English common law, the
duties of the Attorneys General in the United States have been broad-
such proceedings or prosecutions. Fifth-To investigate alleged violations of the stat-
utes which the Attorney General has a duty to enforce and to conduct other investiga-
tions in connection with assisting in the prosecution of a criminal offense at the request
of a State's Attorney. Sixth-To consult with and advise the governor and other state
officers, and give, when requested, written opinions upon all legal or constitutional
questions relating to the duties of such officers respectively. Seventh-To prepare,
when necessary, proper drafts for contracts and other writings relating to subjects in
which the state is interested. Eighth-To give written opinions, when requested by
either branch of the general assembly, or any committee thereof, upon constitutional or
legal questions. Ninth-To enforce the proper application of funds appropriated to the
public institutions of the state, prosecute breaches of trust in the administration of such
funds, and, when necessary, prosecute corporations for failure or refusal to make the
reports required by law. Tenth-To keep, a register of all cases prosecuted or defended
by him, in behalf of the state or its officers, and of all proceedings had in relation
thereto, and to deliver the same to his successor in office. Eleventh-To keep on file in
his office a copy of the official opinions issued by the attorney general and deliver same
to his successor. Twelfth-To pay into the state treasury all moneys received by him for
the use of the state. Thirteenth-To attend to and perform any other duty which may,
from time to time, be required of him by law. Fourteenth-to attend, present evidence
to and prosecute indictments returned by each Statewide Grand Jury.
15 ILL. Con'. STAT. ANN. 205/4 (West 1991).
180. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 10 at vii.
181. People v. Continental Beneficial Assoc., 204 Ill. App. 501, 503 (1917) (allowing the At-
torney General to freeze assets of insolvent foreign corporation within the state of Illinois for
payment to consumer creditors who were injured by defendant corporation).
182. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois v. Barrett, 46 N.E.2d 951, 958 (I11. 943) (repre-
senting members of the board of trustees from the University of Illinois).
183. On December 29, 1999, Attorney General Jim Ryan "filed six home repair lawsuits
cracking down on companies that do shoddy work or fail to inform customers of their three-day
right to cancel contracts." Ryan Cracks Down on Home Repair Rip-Offs, at http://www.ag.state.
il.us/html (visited Jan. 18, 2000).
184. On December 6, 1999, Attorney General Jim Ryan named a landfill in Pekin, Illinois, in
a federal environmental lawsuit filed with the Pollution Control Board claiming groundwater
violations. Pekin Landfill Sued for Alleged Groundwater Violations, at http://www.ag.state.il.us/
html (visited Jan. 18, 2000).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:743
ened to include a specific duty to the people. "In addition to repre-
senting [the] state and its agencies, [the] Attorney General is
responsible for representing broader interests of the state,"'18 5 which is
representative of the larger goal and purpose of the office. 186
The Attorney General's office has traditionally prosecuted con-
sumer protection cases, not for the profitability or likelihood of settle-
ment, but for the overall public good that would result from such an
action.187 The Attorney General of the State of Illinois acts as a con-
stant advocate for the people and is not motivated by money, profit-
ability, or career advancement, but rather by an overwhelming duty to
protect the officers, agencies, and people of Illinois. In an effort to
further this purpose, the Attorney General of Illinois often makes use
of its broad authority to appoint outside counsel to assist with the nu-
merous actions that the office is responsible for overseeing.
1. Power to Appoint Special Attorneys in Illinois
In Illinois, it is impossible to pinpoint with precision when and
where the Attorney General was granted the authority to appoint
Special Assistants. Illinois case law has continually held that such au-
thority is implicit in the office and has been retained since the com-
mon law of England.188 There is no statute in Illinois that expressly
authorizes such appointment, 189 nor is there any early decision in Illi-
185. People v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ill. 1992) (finding that the Attorney
General had authority to represent the state against contractors in fraud and breach of contract
action for illegal dumping of construction material).
186. The term "broader interests" was first used in E.P.A. v. Pollution Control Board, 372
N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ill. 1977). The term "broader interests" means that the Attorney General's pri-
mary concern is always the "State and the public interest." Id. No matter what the case or
controversy may be, the Attorney General's highest duty is to the state and its public. There-
fore, all actions taken by the office should be guided by the "broader interests" of the office. Id.
187. Jeremiah W. Nixon, the Attorney General of Missouri, states in his mission statement
that "[a]s the state's chief law enforcement officer, I am committed to protesting the safety and
welfare of all Missourians. The AG's Office aggressively prosecutes those who break criminal,
environmental and consumer protection laws and defends the state against legal actions." See
Missouri Attorney General's Office Homepage, at http://www.ago.state.mo.us/html (visited Jan.
19, 2000). Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, states in his welcome statement that his
office "works to ensure the safety of the people of California... [and is] dedicated to enforcing
the law and putting sex offenders, murderers and drug dealers behind bars." See California
Attorney General's Office Homepage, at http://www.caag.state.ca.us/welcome.htnl(visited Jan.
19, 2000).
188. Saxby v. Sonneman, 149 N.E. 526, 529 (Ill. 1925).
189. It may be more relevant to consider that there is no statute that denies the Attorney
General the power to appoint Special Assistants. Since such a power is not expressly forbidden
by the state constitution, such authority must reside within the common law. The only statute
which reflects the common law power or appointment is the section of the Illinois the Attorney
General Act which provides for the appointment of a substitute attorney. The Act states that:
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nois case law that notably spotlights the source of this power. The
Illinois courts have simply relied on the common law as the sole
source of authority.190 Since the Illinois courts have held that the Illi-
nois Attorney General possesses all of the powers known to the office
at common law and that authority cannot be limited by the legisla-
ture,' 91 the authority to appoint Special Assistants remains an inher-
ent power of the office.
Despite a lack of express authorization, Illinois courts have rou-
tinely upheld the broad power of the Attorney General to appoint
Special Assistants to assist in the wide area of enforcement that the
Attorney General is required to cover. 192 The first recorded use of
Whenever the attorney general is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in
any cause or proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is or may be his duty to prosecute or
defend, the court in which said cause or proceeding is pending may appoint some com-
petent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause or proceeding, and the attorney so
appointed shall have the same power and authority in relation to such cause or pro-
ceeding as the attorney general would have had if present and attending to the same.
15 ILL. CoM. STAT. ANN. 205/6 (West 1991).
190. Although it is a distinctly different office with its own history, the office of the State's
Attorney can be examined to compare its power of appointment of Special Assistants with the
similar power held by the Attorney General. Unlike the office of the Attorney General, which
has no express statute, the appointment of a Special Assistant State's Attorney is provided for in
55 ILL. COM. STAT. 5/3-9008 (West 1991). In People v. Hickman, the court held that the pur-
pose of the statutory provision for the appointment of Special Assistant States Attorney is to
prevent any influence upon the discharge of the duties of the State's Attorney by reason of
personal interest. 128 N.E. 484, 487 (Il. 1920). See also EPA v. Pollution Board, 372 N.E.2d 50,
52 (II. 1977) (holding that the a special States Attorney could only be appointed to eliminate a
conflict of interest where the States Attorney is an interested party as a private individual, or an
actual party to the litigation); People v. Morley, 678 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (I1. 1997) (holding that
there was no conflict requiring appointment of a Special Assistant States Attorney where the
defendant was charged with attempted murder of an employee of the State's Attorneys office);
Suburban Cook County Regional Office of Education v. Cook County Board, 667 N.E.2d 1064,
1074 (Ill. 1996) (finding that a court can properly appoint a Special States Attorney when the
states attorney has refused to represent a public officer who requires representation).
191. See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
192. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. The National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral has recognized that "[n]early all jurisdictions employ some special counsel to supplement
the services of the Attorneys General Staff." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, COMMr-I-EE ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 296 (1971). However, it also
has recommended that "the use of special or part-time counsel be restricted to unusual circum-
stances, as it tends to be an inefficient method of providing legal services." Id. Although the use
of Special Assistants has been challenged in courts across the country, the authority of the re-
spective Attorneys General has been continually upheld. The Mississippi Supreme Court has
upheld the power of the Attorney General to hire special counsel whenever he or she felt it was
necessary. State v. Mayes, 28 Miss. 706 (1855). The Louisiana Supreme Court has also upheld
the authority of its Attorney General to employ special counsel to either assist or perform crimi-
nal prosecutions alone. State v. Anderson, 29 La. Ann. 774 (1877); State v. Russell, 26 La. Ann.
68 (1874). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General possessed complete
authority to appoint Special Assistants, determine the duration of employment, decide which
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the authority in Illinois was a simple commercial action in 1923.193 In
Punch v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 9 4 Robert N. Holt appeared
as a Special Assistant on behalf of Attorney General Edward J. Brun-
dage. 195 In Punch, the Appellate Court of Illinois granted the defen-
dant an injunction to restrain the State Superintendent of Insurance
from threatening the revocation of the defendant's license.196 The
opinion of the case had nothing to do with, nor did it even discuss, the
propriety of the Special Assistant's appointment. As a result, it can be
justifiably concluded that the court recognized the inherent power of
the Attorney General to make such an appointment. 197
It was not until 1925 that the Illinois Supreme Court officially rec-
ognized the appointment power of the office as one of the powers
retained by the common law. In Saxby v. Sonnemann, the court held
that "[i]t is, of course, easily seen that in a great state such as this the
multiplicity of duties of the Attorney General forbid personal atten-
tion to all of them. He must, and does, have power to appoint the
necessary deputies or assistants to aid in carrying out those duties.' 198
Although the court did not expressly state that the Attorney General
had the ultimate authority to hire private counsei, deputize them as
Special Assistants, and enter into contingency fee contracts, the Saxby
decision has become the most frequently cited case as an expression of
the common law source of the Attorney General's appointment
power.' 9 9 Following the Saxby decision, Illinois courts began to ex-
projects would be handled, and establish what compensation would be paid. State v. Crabbe,
109 Ohio 623 (1924).
193. See Punch v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 230 Il. App. 656 (1923) (denying a motion for dissolu-
tion of a temporary injunction against the State Superintendent of Insurance). This is the first
time court records reflect that a Special Assistant Attorney General appeared in court on behalf
of the Attorney General. It is important to note that the author's search of Illinois court records
was performed via the WestLaw computer database, which at the time of inquiry only cataloged
Illinois Supreme Court cases to 1819, and Illinois Appellate Court cases to 1877. Any search for
information regarding the appearance of Special Assistants prior to those dates was beyond the
capabilities of the author. An additional difficulty in investigation is that Special Assistants may
not always have been given the title "Special Assistants." Although this modem title has been
utilized for some time, the same position may have been referenced by a different title prior to
1923, the date of the above case. Efforts to discover such a variance have been unsuccessful as
of the publication date of this Comment.
194. 230 Ill. App. 656 (1923).
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. If the court had some objection or problem with the members of the Illinois bar that
were appearing before it on that day, there would be some indication or acknowledgement. As a
result, we can conclude that the court inherently recognized the Attorney General's power to
appoint Special Assistants.
198. 149 N.E. 526, 529 (II1. 1925).
199. The Attorney General's power to appoint Special Assistants is only one of the possible
ways that Illinois Courts have recognized that a Special Assistant can be created. Courts have
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pressly hold that "the Attorney General has the inherent power to
appoint Special Assistants. '20 0 Today, the appointment power of the
Attorney General in Illinois is no longer questioned. The common
law roots of the authority have been firmly established and the Attor-
ney General continues to make appointments as needed.
In Illinois, Special Assistants are utilized to undertake a variety of
efforts.201 For example, the Attorney General will often look to
outside counsel when a conflict occurs that would prevent the office
from representing an officer of the state. 20 2 In other situations, the
Attorney General may require special expertise, may be too busy to
pursue an action, or simply not have the human or financial resources
also recognized the power of the legislature to create a Special Assistant expressly by statute. In
People v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a provision
of the Highway Commission Act that entitled the commission to appoint Special Assistants to
aid in the many legal issues that would arise during the existence of the Highway Commission.
120 N.E.2d 35, 46 (Ill. 1954). Illinois courts have also recognized the power of a Special Assis-
tant to be created through a court appointment. The Illinois statute expressly states that,
"[w]henever the attorney general is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in any
cause or proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is or may be his duty to prosecute or defend, the
court ... may appoint some competent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause or proceed-
ing. 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/6 (1998). In Tully v. Edgar, the Illinois Appellate court appointed
a Special Assistant Attorney General to represent trustees of the University of Illinois who had
been fired as a result of a statute passed by the state legislature. 676 N.E.2d 1361, 1367 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997). The court ordered the Attorney General to create a Special Assistant to represent the
claims of the trustees. See id. This created a precarious situation because the Attorney General
was also required to represent the opposite end of the litigation in favor of the state and argue to
uphold the legislative action. See id. The Attorney General challenged the court's action on the
basis of a conflict of interest. See id. The court held that "to the extent that the Attorney
General has a conflict in the representation of an elected official which the attorney general is
unable or unwilling to resolve, the circuit court has the authority to remove that conflict through
the appointment of a special attorney." Id.
200. Sears v. State of Illinois, 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 452, 458 (1964).
201. The National Association of Attorneys General has reported that while nearly every
jurisdiction uses Special Assistants, only sixteen use the power of appointment frequently. NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIAION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITrEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL 298 (1971).
[T]he type [of] cases where special counsel are employed fall into several classifications.
Nearly all the jurisdictions which report frequent employment of special counsel use
them in title and condemnation cases. Collection cases are also mentioned frequently,
as are public utility rate cases. Some offices use special counsel in antitrust cases, par-
ticularly those in out-of-state courts. A number of Attorneys General report that pri-
vate attorneys are hired when special expertise is needed or when a case of special
importance or notoriety is involved. Outside counsel may be hired where conflicts be-
tween two agencies exist and the Attorney General declines to represent both sides.
Washington and West Virginia are among states which say that special counsel is em-
ployed in such cases.
Id.
202. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 46 N.E.2d at 967 (finding that the Attorney
General was not the sole representative of Trustees and limiting the Attorney General's
involvement).
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that the case would require.20 3 Regardless of why the Special Assis-
tant is needed, during the time period he serves, the appointed attor-
ney is vested with the full authority and power of the office of the
Attorney General.2°4 As a result, the appointed attorneys vested with
the title "Special Assistants" have an implicit duty to represent the
people of the State of Illinois "as the [A]ttorney [G]eneral would have
had if [he was] present and attending the same. '20 5 While it is a privi-
lege to act on behalf of the people of the State of Illinois as a Special
Assistant, the appointed attorney does not accept the position on a
pro bono basis, and is therefore entitled to be compensated for his or
her time and effort. The issue then becomes how the Special Assist-
ants should be compensated and how that compensation should be
determined.
2. Compensation of the Special Attorney General
Similar to the power of the Attorney General to appoint Special
Assistants, the power to compensate Special Assistants has no express
source or beginning. Illinois courts have recognized that if the Attor-
ney General can appoint Special Assistants, there must be a corre-
sponding power to compensate them for their efforts.20 6
Until recently, the compensation of Special Assistants, was never an
issue because they did not oversee groundbreaking cases or handle
front-page litigation. Historically, most Special Assistants have acted
on behalf of the Attorney General to collect money owed to the state
or to counsel state employees requiring representation.20 7 Most of the
Special Assistant's appointments proceeded without difficulty. 20 8 For
203. See Daniel J. Capra, The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. Rav.
2827, 2856 (1999) (comments of Bob Montgomery) (discussing the state legislatures disapprov-
ing of the millions of dollars required to go after the tobacco industry, needed by the states to
recruit Special Assistants).
204. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
205. 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANrN. 205/6 (West 1996).
206. See infra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
207. See Tully, 676 N.E.2d at 1367 (holding that a court could eliminate a conflict of interest
by appointing a Special Assistant to represent a university trustee against the state and ensure
that the appointed attorney would receive compensation for services); Morton v. Hartigan, 495
N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (terminating a Special Assistant when he breached a
loyalty to the office he was assigned to represent); Potter v. The State of Illinois, 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 26,
35 (1983) (awarding claimants amount owed for legal fees and expenses while serving as Special
Assistant in the place of the Attorney General and as representation for the director of the State
of Illinois Department of General Services); Sears, 24 Il. Ct. Cl. at 459 (1964) (denying a claim
for legal fees owed to claimant for representation of the Auditor of Public Accounts and the
Director of Financial Institutions).
208. See supra note 207.
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example, the appointment was made, the appointed attorneys pro-
vided their services, and they were justly compensated. 20 9
Although Illinois courts have repeatedly recognized the Attorney
General's authority to appoint Special Assistants and to set a reasona-
ble rate of compensation, the actual definition of reasonable compen-
sation has been subject to interpretation by Illinois courts. 210 For
example, in Potter v. State of Illinois, the Illinois Court of Claims held
that a private attorney acting as a Special Assistant was "entitled to
reasonable compensation from the State for the services provided."'211
Further, in Gould v. State of Illinois, the Illinois Court of Claims did
not inquire as to the reasonableness of the compensation, but rather
approved the fees owed to the Special Assistant based on the recom-
mendation of the Attorney General.212 Despite the fact that the defi-
nition of "reasonable compensation" was not expressly stated, the
system worked fairly efficiently. The office of the Attorney General
appointed Special Assistants as required, and provided reasonable
compensation for their services. 213
Within the past decade, however, the form of compensation for
Special Assistants has been altered. Rather than using the traditional
compensation methods, the Attorney General began to enter into
contingency fee contracts with Special Assistants. Although contin-
209. See supra note 207.
210. See supra note 207. The National Association of Attorneys General has stated that a
major problem in the use of special counsel is setting compensation. States follow dif-
ferent patterns in determining compensation. The Attorney General and the special
attorney agree on a fee in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Minnesota, Oregon, the Vir-
gin Islands, and Washington. Michigan, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming specify
that the fee is set by contract. Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, and
New Mexico pay on an hourly basis. Arizona pays some special counsel by the hour
and others a monthly salary. In Massachusetts and Vermont, an hourly rate is paid in
some cases and a percentage fee in others. Ohio pays one-third of the amount col-
lected in claims cases, and standard fees in others. West Virginia and Colorado specify
that fees are set according to the bar association minimum. New Jersey pays in accor-
dance with a predetermined fee schedule. New York reports that compensation is de-
termined flexibly, as indicated by the situation involved.
NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL 297 (1971).
211. Potter, 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 33 (emphasis added).
212. Gould, 6 I11. Ct. Cl. 87 (1928).
213. Illinois is not the only state that has difficulty interpreting the definition of "reasonable."
Three factors that courts use when asking if fees are reasonable are: "(1) the novelty and diffi-
culty of the issues as they are presented when the lawsuit is brought; (2) the extent to which
other work is preempted by the fact that the lawyers take in the case involved; and (3) for
contingent fees, the chance of success." See Capra, supra note 204, at 2839 (comments of Bar-
bara Gillers).
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gency fees2 14 are widely used by attorneys in private practice, the use
of these contracts by government agencies is a novel application.215
However, within the past few years, the State Attorneys General have
begun to utilize contingency fees as a form of compensation for the
use of Special Assistants.2 16 This specific form of compensation has
yet to be challenged in an Illinois court, thus it is assumed that the
Attorney General's authority to enter into such contracts is a mere
extension of the power to set reasonable compensation.21
7
Actions involving Special Assistants are normally uneventful, and
they generally go unnoticed by the general public.2 18 If not for the
recent tobacco litigation, the use of contingency fee contracts in the
offices of the Attorneys General may never have been questioned.
On its face, there appears to be nothing wrong with the use of contin-
gency fee contracts. Objectively, contingency fee contracts are merely
another form of compensation that the Attorney General has chosen
to utilize. However, the recent tobacco litigation altered the scenario
by placing billion-dollar settlements and million-dollar attorney fees
in the headlines of every major American newspaper.21 9
III. SPECIAL AT-rORNEYs GENERAL AND TOBACCO LITIGATION
In recent years, the tobacco industry has been characterized by
health organizations and consumer action groups as evil incarnate. 220
214. Contingency fees are defined as an "[a]rrangement between attorney and client whereby
attorney agrees to represent client with compensation to be a percentage of the amount recov-
ered .... Frequently used in personal injury actions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 614 (6th ed.
1990).
215. The use of contingency fees has traditionally been reserved for the private sector. Prior
to the recent decade, government actions were rarely, if ever initiated on the basis of a contin-
gency fee. When the Attorney General required the services of a Special Assistant, he would
hire a private attorney at a reasonable rate. The Attorney General did not need to use a contin-
gency fee in order to entice attorneys to assume the role of a Special Assistant.
216. See infra notes 239-260, 384-387 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 199, 201.
219. Joan Beck, The Great Con Game $206 Billion Settlement Worthless Except to Lawyers
and Tobacco Industry, Cm. TRm., Dec. 6, 1998, at A21; Terry Ganey, Legal Fees in Tobacco Case
are Yet to be Set; They Could be as Much as $100 Million; Court Case Challenges System, ST.
Louis POST - DISPATCH, September 10, 2000, at Cl; Cornelia Grumman, State Tobacco Yield
Could be in Billions, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1998, at Al; Michael Perlstein, Tobacco Attorneys'
Huge Fees Questioned; $575 Million Payment Deal a Bargain for L.A., Ieyoub Says; TIMES-PICA-
YUNE, May 17, 2000, (New Orleans) at Al; $6,700 an Hour? Lawyers' Tobacco-Suit Fees Invite
Revolt, USA TODAY, May 22,2000, at A24; Is $30,000 an Hour a Reasonable Fee?, WASH. POST,
August 13, 2000, at B8.
220. See George F. Will, The Tobacco Melee, WASH. POST Feb. 15, 1998, at C9 (also found
online, at http://www.forces.org/articles/files/will.htm) (visited Sept. 29, 2000) (quoting the Texas
Attorney General who commented that the tobacco industry ranks "alongside the worst of civili-
zation's empires"); see also George J. Annas, Tobacco Litigation as Cancer Prevention: Dealing
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In the modern age of health awareness, the tobacco producers have
been on the defensive about the risks their product poses to the public
and what the industry may or may not know about the potential ad-
dictive nature of their product.22' Since individual plaintiffs, injured
by the effects of tobacco, had limited success with their private suits
against the tobacco industry, the Attorneys General of the United
States decided to lend some support to the fight. Although the battle
against tobacco began in a few select states, the war soon waged in
every state.222 When the smoke cleared, the tobacco industry agreed
to settle with the states for an astronomical amount of money, the
likes of which has never before been seen in a product liability
action.223
A. A Review of the Tobacco Litigation
The fight against the tobacco industry was not easily won.224 The
offices of the Attorneys General across America gained submission
from the tobacco industry only after banding together in a concerted
effort against tobacco. 225 The Attorneys General recognized that they
could not handle this fight on their own; therefore, a majority of the
states involved in the tobacco litigation sought the aid and support of
outside counsel. 226 Through the appointment of Special Assistants,
the offices of the Attorneys General deputized private attorneys to
conduct the litigation on behalf of the state. 227 As expected, this ser-
vice did not come free of charge, and as a result, most of the states
with the Devil, 336 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 304 (1997) (stating that the tobacco companies have
come to personify the devil).
221. The fight against the tobacco companies has occurred in three waves. See Annas, supra
note 220, at 304. The first wave (1954-1973) began when medical research first linked tobacco to
cancer. Id. The second wave (1983-1992) is marked by individual plaintiffs challenging the to-
bacco industry with little or limited success. Id. Despite much medical research, there was still
no medical proof that the tobacco caused cancer. Id. The third wave (1994-present) was a suc-
cess due in large part to state-sponsored lawsuits against the industry. See id. Additional ele-
ments that contributed to the success of the third wave was the discovery of secret industry
documents indicating that the industry had knowledge of the addictive potential of nicotine, and
medical proof that the tar ingredient benzopyrene causes cancer. Id.
222. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2828.
223. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
224. In order to objectively evaluate the role of the Special Assistants in the tobacco litiga-
tion, two assumptions must be made. First, one must accept that challenging the tobacco indus-
try was an appropriate course of action for the office of the Attorney General. If this
proposition cannot be accepted, then it will be impossible to view the underlying issues of this
Comment. Second, one must also assume that the State Attorneys General could not have con-
ducted the litigation themselves and therefore required the use of Special Assistants.
225. See McCarron, infra note 256.
226. Four states did not employ Special Assistants for the tobacco cases. See infra note 329.
227. See infra notes 239-260 and accompanying text.
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entered into contingency fee contracts with the Special Assistants.2 28
The problem with these contingency fee contracts stems from the fact
that the Special Assistants selected to participate in the tobacco cases
were not chosen objectively, but rather on the basis of their personal,
political, or financial ties to each respective Attorney General.22
9
In November of 1998, the tobacco industry settled with forty-six of
the fifty states for $206 billion, 230 an amount which will be gradually
awarded over the next five years.231 The actual amount awarded to
each state may increase due to the fact that each individual state has
the option to waive the terms of the settlement and pursue the to-
bacco industry under its own initiative.232 The four remaining states
of Mississippi, Texas, Florida, and Minnesota, each settled individually
with the tobacco industry, 233 prior to the multi-state agreement, for
$40 billion.234
Illinois was one of the states involved in the multi-state settlement
and has agreed to take its portion of the $206 billion award. Illinois is
scheduled to receive more than $9 billion from the forty-six state set-
tlement,235 over the next twenty-five years, through annual payments
of $350 million.2 36 Proponents of the state's efforts to hold the to-
bacco industry accountable for the effects of tobacco on the public
have failed to recognize that the real victors in this battle were not the
states, or even the consumers, but rather the Special Assistants.
B. Lawyers: The Real Winners
Out of the smoke of the tobacco litigation, a select group of attor-
neys emerged to lead the fifty United States in the battle against the
tobacco giants. No matter what their true motives may have been,
these attorneys realized a larger windfall from the tobacco litigation
228. See infra notes 239-260 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 239-260 and accompanying text.
230. See Capra, supra note 203, at 2828 (comments of Daniel Capra) (discussing the state's
settlement).
231. Milo Geyelin, States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at
B13.
232. Id.
233. Daniel Wise, State May Share in Settlement of Tobacco Case, N.Y. U., Dec. 24, 1998, 1,
at 6.
234. Id. See also Capra, supra note 203, at 2827-28 (comments of Daniel Capra) (discussing
the order of tobacco litigation and settlements in various states).
235. Margaret O'Brien, Lawmakers Make Plans for Tobacco Suit Funds Panel Gathering Ideas
on Spending $91 Billion, Cn. TRIB., July 13, 1999, at B1.
236. Id.
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than any other litigation conducted to date. 237 These new billionaire
attorneys were selected to lead the crusade against big tobacco, not
necessarily because of their skill or prowess in the field, but because of
their close social and political ties with the Attorney General of their
state. 238
Attorneys appointed by the former Texas Attorney General, for ex-
ample, received more than three billion dollars for their efforts in the
litigation.239 When calculated over the time spent on the project, the
Special Assistants in Texas were paid over $92,000 per hour.240 In ad-
dition to the shocking amount of compensation that the Special As-
sistants received, it was not mere coincidence that the five Texas firms
that handled the tobacco litigation donated nearly $150,000 in contri-
butions to the Texas Attorney General's Office.241 As a result, the
new Texas Attorney General, John Cornyn, has begun an investiga-
tion into rumors that the former Attorney General Dan Morales solic-
ited one million dollars from each of the lawyers he hired to pursue
the tobacco litigation.242 Cornyn claims that Morales required the five
attorneys who eventually represented the State of Texas to pay such
an amount in order to work the case. 243 In addition, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) began an inquiry into the disputed fee
agreement between Morales and private attorney Marc Murr.244
237. See Bob Van Voris, That $10 Billion Fee: The New Tobacco Deal Will Generate the Larg-
est Fee Ever - And It May Grow, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 30, 1998, at Al. See also James V. Grimaldi,
Lawyers Could Get Billions in Tobacco Deal, SEATTILE TiMsS, Oct. 5, 1997, at Al.
238. See infra notes 241-255 and accompanying text. The author acknowledges that the criti-
cism of Special Assistants is in no way a novel concept. Attorneys General across the country
have been hiring Special Assistants based on subjective criteria without protest for years. When
the Attorney General's office had extra work to be performed, it looked to friends and col-
leagues of the office for such appointments. Only now, in the wake of the tobacco litigation, is
the system of appointment being criticized. Although it may be hypocritical, the fact that Special
Assistants were appointed by less than objective means was of no concern prior to the multi-
billion-dollar settlements of the tobacco cases. The system of appointment proceeded as it al-
ways had, and no one cared. However, the tobacco litigation changed everything because attor-
neys' fees were amounting to billions of dollars, rather than merely hundreds or thousands of
dollars. To argue that the system of appointment was never attacked before, and therefore
should not be attacked today, is unconvincing. The mere fact that the system was never ques-
tioned is an insufficient justification for approving the process today.
239. See Van Voris, supra note 237.
240. Id.
241. Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing out the Rule of Law, 22 S. ILL. U.
L. J. 601, 641 (1998). See also Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers,
WEEKLY STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1996, at 21.
242. Clay Robison, Cornyn Moves in On Anti-Tobacco Lawyers; Attorney General Wants Dep-
ositions to Turn up the Heat on Dan Morales, Hous. CHRON., April 28, 2000, at A29.
243. Id.
244. Clay Robison, FBI Raises Questions in State's Tobacco Suit; Morales Contacts With Two
Attorneys at Issue, Hous. CHRON., February 18, 1999, at Al.
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Morales and Murr worked together at a Houston law firm in the
1980s, and under the contingency fee agreement, Murr was entitled to
receive $520 million.245 Cornyn has alleged that Murr's fees were
"procured by fraud. ' 246 Cornyn has suggested that the fee agreement
between Morales and Murr was "fake," and although it was purported
to be executed before the beginning of the litigation in 1996, it was not
actually created until 1998, after a settlement in the case.2 47 One day
after Cornyn filed a suit alleging that the contract was fraudulent,
Murr withdrew his claim for $260 million from the State of Texas.248
Similarly, the Attorney General of Mississippi, Mike Moore, chose
his number one campaign contributor, Richard Scruggs, to lead Mis-
sissippi's litigation against the tobacco industry.2 49 The tobacco litiga-
tion was not the first time Scruggs had been chosen to represent the
state of Mississippi. His first experience with a government sponsored
contingency fee was in 1992 with his victory over the asbestos industry
on behalf of the State of Mississippi.250 The asbestos contingency fee
contract was awarded to Scruggs only one year after he donated
$20,000 to Moore's re-election campaign. The contingency fee con-
tract eventually allowed Scruggs to collect $2.5 million.251 Following
245. Clay Robison, R.G. Ratcliffe, Texas Attorney General Accuses Predecessor of Fraud;
Hous. CHRON., May 6, 1999, at Al. Under the contingency fee contract, Murr was entitled to
three percent of the state settlement. Id. Under the terms of the agreement, the three percent
fee would equal $520 million. Id. However, after a state arbitration panel reviewed the fee
award it was reduced to $260 million. Murr reportedly worked 2,000 hours, therefore his fee is
equal to $130,000 per hour. Robison, supra note 244. The state arbitration panel which re-
viewed the reward is also being investigated due to allegations that the three judge panel was
hand-picked by Morales and Murr. Id.
246. Robison, supra note 245.
247. Id. Cornyn claims that Murr was working for Morales in a very limited capacity. He
questions whether Murr is deserving of any fee as a result of the settlement. Id. Additionally,
Cornyn claims that the three percent fee agreement between Morales and Murr was not created
until 1998. Id. During that year, Morales allegedly created a "fake" contract and post-dated it
to the year 1996. Id. Morales has responded to these allegations by claiming that Cornyn is
attempting to discredit him in the event that Morales should decide to run for Governor. Id.
Morales, a Democrat, contends that the fee agreements were not post-dated and were legally
executed. Cornyn, a Republican, claims the former Attorney General committed fraud and that
he will continue to investigate. Id.
248. Clay Robison, Morales Case Draws Interest of Grand Jury; Federal Subpoena Seeks
Records on Lawyer's Hiring in Tobacco Suit, Hous. CHRON., June 2, 1999, at Al.
249. See Levy, supra note 241, at 641.
250. Id. Scruggs was hired by the State of Mississippi on the basis of a contingency fee for the
purposes of suing the manufacturers of asbestos. The use of contingency fees in the asbestos
cases marks the beginning of the contingency fees' influence in government sponsored suits.
States such as Mississippi witnessed how well the agreement worked in state sponsored suits, as
well as the large reward that was generated for both the state and the attorneys. When con-
fronted with the enormous task of suing the tobacco industry, the state opted for the same agree-
ment which had previously generated a successful result. Id.
251. See Lochhead, supra note 241, at 21.
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the suit, Scruggs continued to be a generous donor to Moore's politi-
cal campaigns, and as a result, was awarded the role as lead counsel in
Mississippi's suit against the tobacco industry.252 After a successful
bout with the tobacco companies, Scruggs secured a settlement of $4.2
billion for the State of Mississippi. 253 Based on Scruggs' contingency
fee contract with the State of Mississippi, he is entitled to receive
$339.8 million as compensation for his efforts on the case.2 54
In addition to political contributions, personal and political ties
have appeared as factors in the appointment of Special Assistants. In
Illinois, Attorney General Jim Ryan began the litigation against the
tobacco industry by employing out-of-state firs. 255 However, as talk
of settlement grew near, Ryan brought aboard Freeborn & Peters,
"the law firm of his good Republican buddy, former U.S. Attorney
Fred Foreman. 256 As a result, the firm of Freeborn & Peters is sched-
uled to collect over $273 million from the state settlement. 257 Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley has characterized the three percent contingency
fee taken by Freeborn & Peters as "outrageous. '258
252. Philip Terzian, Greed, Not Altruism, is Driving Lawyer Famed for Tobacco Suits, COLUM-
BUS DISPATCH, January 19, 2000, at 9A. The financial donations are evidence that Scruggs was a
loyal contributor to his favorite Democratic government official. Although such political contri-
butions are perfectly legal, this relationship between Scruggs and Moore has been the major
source of criticism for anyone wishing to allege impropriety or misconduct. Unlike the situation
in Texas described above, the allegations of misconduct have never gone beyond mere comments
and critiques in the newspapers.
253. Id. Mississippi was one of the first states to file suit against, and settle with, the tobacco
industry. As a result, many of the other states used the settlement amounts and fee awards from
the State of Mississippi as the standard. Most other states demanded settlements that were ac-
cordingly in line with this early settlement. Id.
254. Jack Elliott, Mississippi Law Firms Get $1.4 Billion in Tobacco Victory, TIE COMMER-
CIAL APPEAL, July 30, 1999, at B2. Scruggs maintains that the fees collected in the tobacco
settlements were justified due to the risk that the attorneys took in each case. Although Scruggs
has categorized his efforts as a form of altruism, he has also used his earnings to fund the
purchase of a private jet, a 120-foot yacht, a forty-foot sailboat, two vacation homes, as well as a
pledge to donate $30 million to charity. Adam Bryant, Who's Afraid of Dickie Scruggs?, NEWS-
WEEK, December 6, 1999, at 46.
255. See John McCarron, Fee Frenzy Pol Pals Get the Job Done, Cn. TRm., July 26, 1999, at
11. Illinois first employed the services of the Seattle based firm of Hagens & Berman. Folly of
the Tobacco-Fee Fight, Cn. TRIB., November 26, 1999, at 14.
256. McCarron, supra note 255. Ryan and Foreman first became friends while serving as sub-
urban states' attorneys. Willaim Hatfield, Ryan Challenged on Tobacco Case, Can. SUN-TiMEs,
May 20, 2000, at 10. Despite this close relationship, Ryan continually maintains that his selection
of firms to represent the State of Illinois was proper and not the result of misconduct. Id. Simi-
lar to the situation in Mississippi, the allegations of the Attorney General using a friendship to
grant a lucrative state contract exist only as allegations. There has never been any formal inves-
tigation or inquiry into these charges, nor is there any indication that one is needed.
257. McCarron, supra note 255.
258. See id.
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Unfortunately, more than one law firm has its hand in the Illinois
money pot. The Cook County State's Attorney Richard Devine and
County Board President John Stroger, both of whom are strong Dem-
ocratic party members, requested that the law firm of Corboy &
Demetrio, a loyal contributor and fundraiser for the Democratic
party, file suit against the tobacco industry on behalf of Cook
County.259 The county will receive a portion of the settlement, but
only after Corboy & Demetrio receives its five percent contingency
fee valued at approximately $125 million 60
Based on the historical information presented thus far, the contin-
gency fees collected by the various Special Assistants across the coun-
try are in fact legal and authorized by the common law.261 Recalling
that the power to appoint Special Assistants was inherited by the At-
torney General from the common law in England,262 any state recog-
nizing the common law powers of the Attorneys General also accepts
the authority of the office to appoint Special Assistants. In Illinois, as
well as many other states, the Attorney General has also been vested
with the corresponding authority to provide compensation for Special
Assistants.263 Since that authority is attached to the common law, the
Attorney General has complete authority to enter into a contingency
fee contract or any other type of compensation deemed necessary. 264
Although the sheer dollar amount of the contingency fee may seem to
indicate a sense of inequality, the common law has established that
this type of agreement is within the powers of the Attorneys
General.265
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Inherent Conflict
The concept of allowing a Special Assistant to profit from a contin-
gency fee contract is as absurd as allowing the Attorney General him-
self to receive a payoff for each fraudulent business he successfully
challenges or each criminal conviction obtained.2 66 In essence, both
ideas are one in the same. Each scenario enables a state employee to
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See generally Part I.
262. See supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 206-217 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 206-217 and accompanying text.
265. This statement is only true for those states that continue to grant the office of the Attor-
ney General its common law powers. See supra notes 143-167.
266. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2832 (comments of Professor Brickman).
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profit from his position of power in the government. Furthermore,
there exists an intrinsic reason why the Attorney General does not
and should not receive a personal financial gain from every successful
case;267 "[w]e do not allow judges or prosecutors to take a percentage
of the award because we know how that will impact on their
behavior." 268
Therefore when a private attorney, acting as a Special Assistant to
the office of the Attorney General, accepts a case on a contingency
fee contract, a violation occurs. The violation is not within the com-
mon or statutory law of a state, but rather it is a violation of the inher-
ent principles upon which the offices of the American Attorneys
General were founded.269 When a Special Assistant collects on a con-
tingency fee contract, he has betrayed the system that has been cre-
ated to protect the citizens of the state.270 Through the use of
contingency fee contracts, the Special Assistant is incapable of per-
forming his duty as an impartial state officer.271 The specific financial
interest that the Special Assistant has taken in the litigation presents
an inherent conflict between the goals of the state and the personal
goals of the appointed attorney.272
The courts have not established a detailed criteria for determining
the proper compensation for a Special Assistant. Thus, the ultimate
question that arises is whether the billion-dollar fees collected across
the country comply with the "reasonable ' 273 requirement set forth by
courts. The critics of contingency fee contracts used by the Attorneys
General fear that as a result of this compensation, the office will be-
come a mere shell that bends at the will of the Special Assistants.274
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The purpose of this Comment is to address the propriety of contingency fees in the con-
text of government actions, not in the legal system in general. Contingency fees in private prac-
tice have typically served a dual purpose. First, contingency fees enable clients who would
otherwise be unable to hire an attorney to have their day in court. A client can retain the
services of an attorney and pay for the services rendered after a successful judgement or settle-
ment is reached. Second, contingency fees encourage attorneys to take cases that appear to be
promising in the hopes that their fees will be covered after a successful outcome. The use of
contingency fees in the context of government fails to meet either of the above purposes. The
state is not offering a contingency fee to an indigent client that is unable to pay a reasonable rate
for legal services. Nor is the state an attorney that requires the prospect of reward if ultimately
successful. Both of these ideas conflict with the "broader interests" of the Attorney General, to
represent the state and the public interest. See E.P.A. v. Pollution Control Board, 372 N.E.2d 50
(11. 1977).
270. See infra notes 283-298 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 283-298 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 283-298 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 304-312.
274. See infra notes 320-328.
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The concern is that the Special Assistants may use the prosecutorial
power of the office to seek out and destroy any industry from which
they can make a profit.275
Special Assistants have appeared in almost all fifty states, nonethe-
less there are a few states that have achieved success in tobacco litiga-
tion while managing the litigation with only attorneys inside the office
of the Attorney General.276 This proves that Special Assistants are
not always needed, yet only a few states subscribe to this philoso-
phy.277 In the wake of the billion-dollar fees paid to Special Assist-
ants, many states have begun to challenge the authority of the
Attorneys General to enter into contingency fee contracts with varied
success.278 Based on individual state law, the future of state spon-
sored contingency fee contracts is bleak in some jurisdictions, and still
going strong in others.279
Those who continue to support the actions of the Special Assistants
argue that the appointed attorneys are entitled to their fees, regardless
of the dollar amount, because of the large amount of risk that they
assumed on behalf of the state. 28° Despite the risk that may have
been taken, the Special Assistants have intrinsically altered the focus
of the office of the Attorney General.
1. Betrayal of the Office
There exists an inherent conflict of interest with the use of contin-
gency fee contracts to compensate Special Assistants. 281 It has al-
ready been established that the office of the Attorney General has
275. See infra notes 320-328.
276. The States of California, Colorado, New Hampshire, and Missouri have each managed
the litigation through the use of in-house counsel of the Attorney General. The specifics of these
situations are further discussed below. See infra notes 329-337.
277. See infra notes 329-337.
278. After the public and government officials realized the size of the fees that Special Assist-
ants were now entitled to recover, many states began to file lawsuits to prevent the payment of
such amounts. Although most states eventually forced the Special Assistants into state spon-
sored mediation, successfully reducing the net amount of the fee awards, the Special Assistants
were still adequately compensated for their efforts. Although this re-negotiation of the contin-
gency fee agreements returned large sums of money to the states, one must recognize that such a
protest by the states after the awards amounts have been determined is an ad hoc approach to
invalidating a contract. Traditionally, parties are unable to agree on the terms of a contract and
subsequently alter those terms after realizing what effect the agreed upon terms have created.
See infra notes 338-365.
279. Similar to how the Attorneys General in each state has evolved into a unique office, the
rule regarding the use of contingency fee contracts must also be reviewed individually by each
state. See infra notes 338-365.
280. See infra notes 367-383.
281. See e.g., Capra, supra note 204, at 2832 (suggesting that the recent tobacco settlements
undermine the fundamental structure of our republican form of government).
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common law roots in the protection of the King and the sovereign
state of England, and historical roots in the protection of the Ameri-
can citizens.282 The slogan of the Illinois Attorney General, "for chil-
dren, for families, for Illinois," 283 is representative of this inherent
civil duty.
The office of the Attorney General has never placed financial com-
pensation on its list of priorities.284 In fact, the duties associated with
the office are the exact opposite. 285 Unfortunately, the State Attor-
neys General are undergoing an unintended and unfortunate transfor-
mation because the offices are succumbing to the very instruments of
political corruption, favoritism, greed, and abuse that the offices typi-
cally work against.286 Since the use of contingency fee contracts in-
trinsically alters the underlying purpose of the office, the use of such
fees must be rejected.
In any action by the State Attorneys General, the client is either the
people of the state or the sovereign state itself.287 Thus, when the
Attorney General appoints a private attorney as a Special Assistant,
that attorney is temporarily transformed into an official representative
of the state. 288 The focus of a Special Assistant's efforts shifts from
one individual client to the broader interests of every citizen within
that state,289 and the fiduciary duty that exists between an attorney
and the client is "doubly so when they are representing the people of a
state.a290
Although the appointment is only temporary, there should be a
seamless incorporation of the Special Assistant into the office of the
Attorney General. When a Special Assistant is bestowed with all the
power and authority of the Attorney General,291 he has a correspond-
282. See generally Part I.
283. Illinois Attorney General Homepage (visited Jan. 20, 2000), at http://www.ag.state.il.us/
html.
284. The list of priorities of the Attorney General is a hypothetical list which includes all of
the ideas which serve the broader purpose of the office as described above. If the broader pur-
pose of the office is to serve the state and the public, then increased financial compensation of its
officers cannot co-exist with the broader purpose of the Attorney General. See supra notes 182-
184.
285. See supra notes 182-184.
286. See supra notes 182-184.
287. See supra notes 182-184.
288. See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/6 (West 1996) (showing that Illinois grants a Special
Assistant the same power and authority as the Attorney General himself).
289. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2842 (comments by Professor Brickman) (stating that an
attorney takes on an additional fiduciary responsibility, above that of a duty to an individual
client, when he represents the state).
290. Id. at 2830.
291. See 15 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 205/6 (West 1996).
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ing duty to represent the state as would the Attorney General himself,
or any other officer within the Attorney General's office.292 It is gen-
erally considered to be the duty of the Attorney General to pursue
worthy cases for the benefit of the greater good. 293 These motives
were intended to guide the office, regardless of the possible financial
gain that could be achieved.2 94
Conceding that the industries being pursued by the Special Assist-
ants are in fact causing an injury to the consumer, the fact that these
appointed attorneys have a significant pecuniary interest in the out-
come of the litigation must not be overlooked.2 95 These interests jade
the perceptions of the Special Assistant and prevent them from per-
forming their temporary duty as an advocate of the state and an of-
ficer of the Attorney General.296
Those members of the plaintiffs' bar [who serve as Special Assist-
ants] are now hopelessly conflicted, serving as government contrac-
tors with financial incentives proportionate to their hoped-for
conquest. The sword of the state is brandished by private counsel
with a direct pecuniary interest in the litigation. On the one hand,
they are driven by the contemplation of a huge payoff; on the other
hand, they fill a quasi-prosecutorial role in which their overriding
objective is supposedly to seek justice. How could such lawyers
possibly evaluate with impartiality the prospect of a settlement, say,
or the tradeoff between injunctive and monetary relief?297
The offices of the State Attorneys General have been "invested with
enormous power of the state [and possess] a solemn public trust. It is
[the State Attorneys General's] moral imperative to make governing
decision[s] solely on the basis of the public interest, rather than out of
concern for personal gain. ' 298 In allowing appointed attorneys to op-
292. See id.
293. A poll conducted by Public Opinion Strategies on behalf of the tobacco companies in
1996 asked residents of Texas what "should be the top priority of [the] Attorney General?" See
Public Opinion Strategies Push Poll (visited Jan. 28, 2000), at http://www.mojones.com/
mother-jones/MJ96/push-pol.html. The responses in the order of most to least popular were as
follows: fighting crime, fighting against government corruption, leading efforts to stop drugs and
drug trafficking, stopping frivolous lawsuits filed in Texas, collecting child support payments,
protecting consumers against business fraud, and suing tobacco companies on behalf of smokers.
See id.
294. See supra notes 182-184.
295. See supra notes 241-260 and accompanying text.
296. Representative Chris Cox of California stated that to give a Special Assistant a financial
stake in the outcome of the case "creates an inherent conflict of interest with the lawyer's role as
an officer of the court." See Will, supra note 220.
297. Levy, supra note 242, at 640-41 (describing legislation authored by Chris Cox that would
limit the hourly fee to $150 per hour).
298. Martin H. Redish, Commentary: Smoking Gun for Private Lawyers in Tobacco Suit is
Greed, Cfz. TRm., May 8, 1997, at 31.
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erate under contingency fee contracts, the Attorneys General have
created an inherent conflict between an attorney's personal goals and
the goals of the state.
2. How Much Money is "Reasonable?"
Special Assistants employed across the country have a right to be
compensated for their efforts. That statement should not be in dis-
pute. Some supporters argue that the appointed attorneys, acting as
Special Assistants, are merely business persons taking a risk on an
investment; therefore, supporters argue that Special Assistants are en-
titled to reap the benefits of the contracts, whatever they may be.299
However, it is questionable whether contingency fee contracts were
ever intended to be used in the context of government action. 300
The use of contingency fee contracts in the private field have
proven to be a vital tool to keep the legal system open to the public. 301
Through the use of contingency fee contracts, consumers or injured
parties with limited funds are able to secure legal representation and
have their day in court.302 Although the private legal system benefits
from the use of contingency fee contracts, the result is quite different
when a contingency fee is placed in the context of a government
action. 303
299. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2830 (comments of Professor Brickman).
300. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that
"a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent-fee basis by one who is
able to pay a reasonable fixed fee." See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-20
(1992). There is a significant argument that the individual state governments involved in the
tobacco suits have the resources to pay normal fees on an hourly basis. See id.
301. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2836. Contingency fees are in fact unique to the United
States because they are unlawful in the United Kingdom and most other legal systems through-
out the world. See supra note 220. The United States has maintained the use of contingency fees
to keep the legal system open to all persons, regardless of their financial status. See id. There
are critics on the other side of the issue that argue contingency fees should not be used at all. See
generally Walter Olson, Sue City: The Case Against the Contingency Fee, 55 POL'Y REv. 46 (Win-
ter 1991) (noting that contingency fees encourage ethical abuses in the American legal system).
The contingency fee provides incentive to private attorneys to take on a case even if their client
does not have money to pay attorneys fees. "There are people who cannot afford to pay lawyers,
there are industries that will not be taken on there are cases that will not be brought unless we
allow contingency fees." Capra, supra note 204, at 2847 (comments of Barbara Gillers).
302. Bob Montgomery, one of the attorneys that represented the State of Florida against the
tobacco industry, commented that the contingency fee is the only tool that allows him to take on
big business. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2836. Since large industries simply try to out spend
their opponents in litigation, attorneys need the contingency fee to be able to fund their own
efforts. See id. "How in the hell, without the contingency fee from all the persons that I have
represented ... [could I] take on insurance companies that spend dollar-for-dollar-every damn
dollar they spend, I spend two dollars." Id.
303. Barbara Gillers has suggested that since the private attorneys were serving as Special
Assistants for the "public purpose," they may have a moral or professional calling to return to
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For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that in deter-
mining payment of Special Assistants, "the compensation must be
substantial, but it must also be considerably less than that which
would be allowable in private practice. ' '30 4 The Delaware Supreme
Court has highlighted a significant fact with this statement. In becom-
ing Special Assistants, private attorneys have consciously foregone
their role as a typical plaintiff's attorney advocating for a client.30 5 As
a result, the private attorney exchanges his usual role and becomes an
advocate of the state and not of his own purse. 306
Since any private attorney appointed as a Special Assistant has ac-
cepted the role voluntarily, the attorney must be willing to forego
many of the aspects of private practice that would normally be associ-
ated with such a position.30 7 A Special Assistant must be willing to
provide his services at a rate of reasonable compensation, realizing
that he will not receive the benefit of a large contingency should his
valiant efforts prove successful. 30 8 Although such a result may be en-
tirely appropriate for private practice, such an outcome is inconsistent
with an individual who is serving as the "chief legal officer of the
State." 30 9
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, fees col-
lected by an attorney in any action must not be "clearly excessive. '310
Many states have taken this ethical rule one step further by requiring
that attorney's fees not only comply with the "clearly excessive" rule,
but that they also be "reasonable. 3 11 These rules of ethical conduct
beg the question, "[a]re these fees, which in many cases amount to
effective hourly rates of return of tens of thousands - and even hun-
the state some of the money they have collected. Capra, supra note 204, at 2847 (comments of
Barbara Gillers). Although she indicates that there is no ethical rule which requires such action,
she acknowledges that there may be a conflict in interest when a government employee receives
such compensation. See id.
304. Application of Young, 104 A. 2d. 263, 266 (Del. 1954).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See E.P.A. v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d at 50.
310. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSaILrrY DR 2-106(A) (1983).
311. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RULE 1.5 (1998) (requiring attorneys fees to be
reasonable); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr RULE 1.5 (1998) (adopting the reasonable re-
quirement in the MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RULE
1.5 (1998) (stating that a lawyers fee must be reasonable); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIL-
rrv DR 2-106 (1990) (requiring that attorneys fees not be excessive).
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dreds of thousands - of dollars an hour, reasonable? I think to ask the
question is to answer it. ' '312
In the wake of the billion-dollar tobacco litigation settlements, one
must realize that "[s]tate prosecutors are doling out multibillion-dollar
contingency fee contracts to private trial lawyers. What is worse,
those contracts are awarded without competitive bidding to attorneys
who are often bankrolling state political campaigns. '313 Many of the
Attorneys General participating in the tobacco litigation chose
friends, colleagues, and financial contributors as the attorneys to par-
ticipate in the windfall settlements. 314 Even if the motives of the par-
ties involved were established in pure altruism, the billions of dollars
involved had an immediate and permanent taint on the entire
transaction. 315
Critics of contingency fees, in this context, argue that every dollar
which goes into the pocket of a Special Assistant is one dollar less that
the public will receive. 316 Former Speaker of the House Newt Ging-
rich commented that the billions of dollars going to attorneys "could
be spent on health in general and on children's health in particular
rather than enriching a small group of trial lawyers. ' 317 The Special
Assistants of the tobacco litigation respond to this argument by stating
that without their efforts the state would not have received any of the
funds that it is now entitled to receive. 318 Despite this counter argu-
ment, it cannot be overlooked that "[t]he money paid by the tobacco
companies to the lawyers reduces the amount the tobacco companies
would have been willing to pay to the state to settle the suit ....
312. Capra, supra note 204, at 2830 (comments of Professor Brickman). Professor Brickman
acknowledges that this same argument could be used against the use of contingency fees in
general. Id. However, this Comment is directed solely at the use of contingency fees in the
context of government-sponsored lawsuits. A counter-argument to the perceived excessiveness
of the fees is to claim that the fees are in fact reasonable, based upon market forces. This argu-
ment ties into the idea that the since the attorneys took the risk and made the investment, the
market requires that this amount of compensation be paid. To further explore this market the-
ory forces a wide statistical analysis of attorney's fees associated with risk to have to be com-
pleted. The author was unable to locate any source that has taken this approach at present.
313. Levy, supra note 242 at 641.
314. See supra notes 241-255.
315. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2848-849 (comments of Professor Brickman) (stating that it
was inevitable that the process for selecting attorneys to represent each state would become
tainted by the volume of money that was going to be received).
316. See generally Capra, supra note 204 (critiquing the tobacco litigation and settlement
processs).
317. See Grimaldi, supra note 237.
318. See infra notes 373-382 and accompanying text.
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That's money taken directly from the pockets of every American
taxpayer. 319
3. Who is Really in Control?
The concern of some critics is not that a few Special Assistants have
become filthy rich, but rather that, as a result, private firms across the
country will become the puppeteers, and the Attorneys General the
puppets. 320 Can a private attorney actually make decisions as well as
or better than the Attorney General? The answer must be no, other-
wise the entire purpose of the office would need to be questioned.
321
"[T]he use of these new legal bounty hunters - invested with the
power of the state but still heavily motivated by personal gain - places
the legitimacy of that system at serious risk.
'322
If contingency fee contracts continue to be used as a means to pay
Special Assistants, there will soon be a situation where "[iut is not the
people's representatives who are making the critical choices; [but
rather] contingency fee lawyers acting for heretofore unimagined
profits. ' 323 Critics of government sponsored contingency fee suits ar-
gue that as a result of creating these rich and influential Special As-
sistants, the policies and practices of the Attorney General and the
state legislature will no longer be led by the officials that the people
have elected. "If this trend continues, economic and social decisions
affecting all Americans will be made not by the democratically elected
[government], but instead by trial lawyers. '324
Critics also fear that these private firms may assume control of the
Attorney General's office and thus have a convincing voice in the ini-
319. See Smoke Clouds: Designated Spending, Legal Fees Cheapen Morales' Victory (visited
Jan. 28, 2000), at http://www.chron.com/content/chron.. .25/smoke-clouds-editorial.0-0.html.
320. In The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, Professor Brickman expressed his earnest
concern for the use of contingency fees by the State Attorneys General. See Capra, supra note
204, at 2832-33. He expressed concern that the success of these new litigation efforts would
encourage a new way of creating public policy during times when the legislature failed to heed to
the public demand. See id. Using the courts as the new form of setting policy denies the public
the political accountability that the republican form of government has created. See id. at 2833.
This would result in the formation of alliances. The deep-pocket industries and the wealthy
plaintiff firms, and the contingency fee attorneys will possess a frightening amount of power that
is exercised outside of the ordinary machinery of representative government. See id.
321. See id.
322. Martin H. Redish, Commentary: Smoking Gun for Private Lawyers in Tobacco Suit is
Greed, Cmi. TRm. May 8, 1999, at 31.
323. Capra, supra note 204, at 2833.
324. See comments of Larry Kraus, President of U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform in
Chamber Criticizes Government Lawsuits: No Industry Immune When Trial Lawyers, Govern-
ment Hunt for Money (visited Dec. 3, 1999) http://www/uschamber.org/media/releases/une99/
062299a.html.
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tiatives and policies of the office. 325 There are "serious concerns over
the use of the new legal bounty hunters to control litigation." 326
"[C]onsider the use of the awesome power of a state against an un-
popular defendant .... Normally, as a matter of policy, we do not
allow the use of the power of government for self-enrichment, since
such a power inevitably is abused. '327 The recent increase in the use
of Special Assistants is indicative of a scenario in the near future
where the machine of contingency fee contracts proceeds to roll over
every unpopular or financially lucrative industry under the guise of
consumer protection. 328
B. It Can be Done Without Outside Counsel
Special Assistants have often argued that the states could not have
fought the tobacco industry without the help of private resources.
However, there are four states that have proven this statement to be
untrue and have conducted their entire suit against the tobacco indus-
try without using the appointment of Special Assistants.329 California,
Colorado, New Hampshire, and Missouri have managed the litigation
through the use of in-house counsel within the office of the Attorney
General. 330 Within each of these states, however, the Attorney Gen-
eral did need the support of the legislature for additional funds. For
example, in California, the legislature appropriated an additional $14
million to hire 132 staffers, including 32 lawyers, to help fight the to-
bacco industry. 331
The Attorney General's office in California commented that "[t]he
fact that we are not using outside counsel lends a lot more credibility
to the legitimacy of these claims. '332 The Attorney General of Colo-
rado also commented that her decision to keep the litigation in-house
was driven by the fact that outside contingency fee attorneys are moti-
vated more by the prospect of money than the pursuit of justice.333
"We tend to be more objective than private counsel who are em-
ployed on a contingency fee basis and who maintain their own per-
325. Id.
326. Redish, supra note 299.
327. Capra, supra note 204, at 2832.
328. See supra notes 384-387 and accompanying text.
329. Id.
330. See supra note 237.
331. See supra note 237.
332. See supra note 237.
333. See supra note 237.
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sonal financial interest in the outcome of the litigation .... It gives
them different motives. '334
In Alaska, the Attorney General's office has successfully adopted
an alternative method of paying private counsel based on an hourly
basis.335 For instance, in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster
where 11 million gallons of crude oil were spilled onto the Alaskan
shores, the state hired the Seattle law firm of Preston Gates & Ellis to
handle the lawsuit.336 After lengthy litigation, the state incurred $32
million in legal fees, but recovered over $900 million in a
settlement.337
C. Challenges to the Contingency Fees
With a few exceptions, the authority of State Attorneys General to
appoint Special Assistants is well established. However, there may be
enough support in a few states to pass legislative initiatives that would
restrict or limit the Attorney General's power to enter into contin-
gency fee contracts with private attorneys. 338 For example, in Mere-
dith v. Ieyoub, an association of oil and gas producers in Louisiana
successfully prevented the Attorney General from hiring a private law
firm on a contingent fee basis to represent the state for environmental
law prosecution. 339 The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the
Attorney General had no authority to enter into contingency fee con-
tracts. 340 The court held that "under the separation of powers doc-
trine, unless the Attorney General has been expressly granted the
power in the constitution to pay outside counsel contingency fees from
state funds, or the Legislature has enacted such a statute, then he has
no such power. '341 In rejecting the contingency fee contract, the court
found that while the powers and duties of the Attorney General were
broad, the authority to pay "outside attorneys to prosecute legal
claims on behalf of the state is a financial matter" and is held by the
legislative branch of the government. 342
334. See supra note 237 (comments of Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton).
335. See supra note 237.
336. See supra note 237.
337. See supra note 237.
338. Such legislative action, however, would be ineffective in Illinois since the courts previ-
ously have held that the common law powers of the Attorney General cannot be limited or
removed by the legislature. See Finnegan, 38 N.E.2d at 715.
339. Meredith v. leyoub, 700 So. 2d 478 (La. 1997).
340. See id. at 481.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 483.
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In the wake of the Louisiana decision, manufacturers of asbestos in
the state of North Dakota attempted to challenge the Attorney Gen-
eral's use of Special Assistants and contingency fees.343 Unfortu-
nately, in State v. Hagerty, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
disagreed with the Supreme Court of Louisiana and subsequently up-
held the use of contingency fee contracts. 344 However, despite the de-
cision to uphold contingency fee contracts, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota recognized the state legislature's authority to restrict
the power of the Attorney General. Although the North Dakota leg-
islature could restrict the power, such a constraint on the office does
not currently exist.345
In Maryland, the tobacco industry made an unsuccessful attempt to
challenge the authority of the State Attorney General to enter into a
contingency fee contract with Special Assistants.346 Using arguments
similar to those used in North Dakota347 and Louisiana,348 the tobacco
company argued that the use of contingency fee contracts enabled the
office of the Attorney General to direct the expenditure of state
funds, an act which was in express violation of state statutes as well as
separation of powers.349 In rejecting the tobacco company's claim, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Attorney General has the
power to set "proper compensation of assistant counsel" at his discre-
tion.350 Rather than looking for a statute which authorized the Attor-
ney General to make contingency fee contracts, the court upheld the
contract because the state statues did "not [expressly] prohibit contin-
gency fee contracts."'351
In contrast, in West Virginia, the tobacco industry itself successfully
challenged the contingency fee contract between Special Assistants
and the Attorney General. 352 The West Virginia Circuit Court agreed
343. State v. Hagerty, 580 N.W.2d 139, 143 (N.D. 1998) (arguing that the use of contingency
fee contracts violates state statutes requiring all monies to be deposited and allocated from state
treasury).
344. See id. at 148.
345. It is important to note that the legislative option suggested by the Supreme Court of
North Dakota would be unavailable in Illinois. Since Illinois courts have expressly held that the
legislature cannot revoke the common law powers of the Attorney General, the legislature
would have no authority to place a restriction on a power that the Illinois Attorney General has
inherited through the common law. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
346. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230 (Md. 1998).
347. See generally Hagerty, 580 N.W. 2d 139.
348. See Meredith, 700 So.2d 478.
349. See Philip Morris Inc., 709 A.2d at 1240.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. McGraw v. American Tobacco Co., No. Civ.A.94-C-1707, 1995 WL 569618 (W.Va.
Cir.Ct. June 6, 1995). The court's decision was founded on the fact that in West Virginia "the
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that the one-third recovery fee, the largest fee agreement of any state,
was unconstitutional. 353 The court accepted the tobacco company's
argument that allowing outside counsel to wield "the coercive, regula-
tory and punitive powers of the state," compromised the "indepen-
dence and impartiality of the quasi-judicial role vested in state
prosecutors. '354 The attorney for the tobacco industry, Robert King,
argued that such contingency fee contracts "permit[ted] the power of
the state to be exercised by attorneys with a direct financial stake in
the exercise of that power. '355
In New Jersey, the tobacco industry once again attempted to invali-
date another contingency fee agreement. 356 However, unlike West
Virginia, New Jersey courts have held in favor of the Attorney Gen-
eral.357 The tobacco industry attempted to argue that the Attorney
General "has no business committing the state to pay money without
the approval of the Legislature. ' 358 Unfortunately, the New Jersey
court was not receptive to the industry's argument. "Not only did
Judge Jack Lintner find the contingency fee agreement valid, he said it
was the arrangement that most benefited the state and the public. '359
Other states have been successful in placing restrictions on the fees
of Special Assistants through regular legislative channels. Since most
states have the authority to establish or eliminate the powers of the
Attorney General through legislative enactments, this appears to be
the simplest solution. The state legislature of Maine capped its attor-
ney's fees for the tobacco litigation at $150 per hour.36° The state of
Vermont has already stipulated that its attorney fees cannot rise over
$200 thousand dollars. 361 However, not every state is willing or able
to exercise this legislative authority over the Attorneys General.
In an effort to make a uniform national policy, critics have sug-
gested that federal action may be needed to eliminate the use of con-
tingency fee contracts by the Attorneys General.362 In 1997, the
Attorney General possesses no common law authority or power and thus lacks standing to insti-
tute or prosecute" such an action. Id. at *2.
353. See Grimaldi, supra note 237.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Cheryl Winokur, Tobacco Fee Pact Intact: Contingency Fee Arrangement Ruled Legal
and, What's More, Sensible, 147 N.J.L.J. 1073 (1997).
357. See id. at 1.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Ridenour, supra note 1.
361. See id.
362. There may be a significant problem with an attempt to restrict the authority of the Attor-
neys General through federal legislation since each of the fifty states are sovereign bodies under
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Senate passed an amendment to the nationwide settlement agreement
that limited the attorneys fees to $250 per hour with a five million
dollar cap.3 6 3 This amendment sponsored by Representative Jeff Ses-
sions of Alabama was approved by only one vote in the Senate and
was not adopted by the House.364 Additional legislation proposed in
1998, by Representative Chris Cox of California, Representative Paul
McHale of Pennsylvania, and Representative Scott McInnis of Colo-
rado suggested the establishment of an hourly rate cap at $150 per
hour.365 Since there has been no further progress on the passage of
federal legislation, it is unlikely that the federal government will play
any major role in determining the future of Special Assistants and
contingency fee contracts. If any change is going to take place, it will
occur within the courts and legislatures of the individual states.
D. Is There Really a Problem With Contingency Fee Contracts?
Despite all of the controversy over contingency fee contracts, there
are two observations about the tobacco litigation that should be rec-
ognized. First, the Special Assistants were victorious in these suits,
thereby enabling the states to hold the tobacco industry financially
responsible for the harm it has caused. 366 Second, a few private attor-
neys did become rich as a result of these suits, but accomplished a feat
that no one else had been able to achieve. Perhaps this achievement
justifies the compensation, no matter how excessive.
Following the success of the tobacco litigation, there are many who
stand by the millionaire appointed attorneys. Some supporters have
argued that "[t]he attorneys who have filed lawsuits against big to-
bacco have spent millions of dollars out of their own pockets without
any assurance that a single penny will ever come back to them. '367
For example, Michael Ciresi, one of the attorneys that represented the
State of Minnesota, defended his fee in stating that he went up against
the control of their individual state governments. The power of the Attorneys General does not
derive from federal law, therefore any national legislation may be unenforceable against any of
the United States.
363. See Grimaldi, supra note 237. Recall that the national settlement was a non-binding
agreement. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. Therefore, even if this fee-limiting mea-
sure was approved by all of Congress, any state wishing to be excluded from this agreement
could pursue attorney's fees through their own means of litigation or arbitration. See id.
364. See Grimaldi, supra note 237. This small victory against attorney's fees was short-lived
because the Senate also adopted another amendment that exempted any state that entered into
a contract with private attorneys. See id.
365. See Will, supra note 220.
366. See Capra, supra note 203.
367. Clifford E. Douglas, Commentary: Altruistic Attorneys, Cm. TRm., May 18, 1996, at A24.
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some of the most powerful law firms in the country.368 Ciresi stated
that his firm looked at over thirty-three million documents, argued
over 200 motions, including seven appeals to the Minnesota State Su-
preme Court and two to the United States Supreme Court, and won
the case against tobacco.369 "We spent millions of dollars, [and] tens
of millions of dollars, in time and out-of-pocket costs. '370
The idea that the private attorneys have assumed the risk of the
litigation and therefore are entitled to the reward has merit,
though far less than meets the eye [because] [t]he lawyers who
spearheaded the tobacco litigation effort ... were privy to the dis-
closures with regard to their own degree of success .... [T]he strat-
egy employed to beat the tobacco companies was ... less a matter
of law, than one ... of war: mass your troops and overwhelm the
tobacco companies by allying with enough state attorneys general to
raise the financial threat to intolerable levels. Success in this politi-
cal endeavor dramatically reduced the risks involved.371
Despite continued criticism, the attorneys who represented the states
against the tobacco companies believed state-sponsored contingency
fee contracts were necessary to take on an industry that had escaped
liability in the past. The tobacco industry had continuously avoided
being held accountable, not because of the particular merits of its
claims, but because it had the ability to drown its opposition in costly
litigation.372 Supporters argue that without the contingency fee con-
tracts and the Special Assistants, the tobacco industry may have never
been defeated.373 "Now we beat 'em, we defeated the cigarette indus-
try and caused the greatest public-health advances in the history of
this country, and all you read in the press is how rich the lawyers are
going to get."'374
Another argument in support of the contingency fee contracts for
Special Assistants is based on the use of hindsight; using the present
perspective to look back in time in order to determine the reasonable-
368. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2837 (comments of Michael Ciresi).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2831.
372. See id., at 2836 (comments of Bob Montomery). Mr. Montomery stated:
The contingency fee allows me to take [big business] on, and I am delighted to do so. If
you take away the contingency fee, you are falling right into the hands of corporate
America, the insurance companies .... I am proud of that contingency fee. If you ever
take it away from me, you better duck, because you don't have a chance.
Id.
373. Id.
374. See Grimaldi, supra note 237 (comments of Don Barrett, Special Assistant Attorney
General for Mississippi).
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ness or excessiveness of the fees collected.375 Thus, if the contingency
fee contracts were fairly entered into, then they should not be dis-
puted merely because the numbers are much higher than anyone
expected. 376
Under the ethics rules, contingency fee arrangements are judged at
the time that they are made, not in hindsight .... [I]f you can say
that the agreement was reasonable ... at the time that it was made,
it does not then become unreasonable at the end of the day when
the fees are very high.3 7 7
Although the motives of the private attorneys involved in the to-
bacco litigation have been continuously scrutinized, the attorneys con-
tinue to defend their intentions as a genuine concern for the harm
tobacco has inflicted on society. For example, Philip H. Corboy, the
attorney handling the litigation on behalf of Cook County in Illinois,
defended his position as a Special Assistant to the county by stating,
"the 'overwhelming force' behind [my] decision.., has nothing what-
soever to do with greed and personal gain. ' 378 Mr. Corboy believes
that his fee, estimated at $125 million, is entirely justified because
"[t]he risks of bringing such cases.., are enormous. Still, these law-
yers ... have taken on this fight because they believe it is winnable
and is the right thing to do. '379
The Attorney General of West Virginia Darrel McGraw defended
his decision to use Special Assistants by stating that, "the State and
her citizens stand only to benefit. The State has no exposure. There
are no lawyer hourly fees. There are no costs. The taxpayers are thus
fully protected. '' 38° Another supporter commented that, "[t]hese 'to-
bacco lawyers' are responsible for recouping and ultimately saving the
American public. .. billions of dollars over years to come. When the
states' attorneys general ... needed help.., they went to the brightest
and most creative legal minds in the country. '381
Perhaps the Special Assistants were the final step necessary to force
the tobacco industry to take responsibility for its actions. "Think
375. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2841 (comments of Barbara Gillers).
376. Id. See also Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that attorney's fee of one million dollars was not clearly excessive or unreasona-
ble when it had been negotiated by two sophisticated parties).
377. See Capra, supra note 204, at 2841 (comments of Barbara Gillers).
378. Philip H. Corboy, Commentary: Lawyers Proud to Battle Big Tobacco, Cn. TIB., May
28, 1997, at A16.
379. See Douglas, supra note 368.
380. Levy, supra note 242, at 641 (citing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Joint
Motion to Prohibit Prosecution of Action Due to Plaintiff's Unlawful Retention of Counsel).
381. Antonio M. Romanucci, Commentary: And Now, A Good Word About Lawyers, Cmi.
TRm., Dec. 29, 1998, at A12.
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about it. After all those years trying to fight smoking with regulations
and ad campaigns, some politicians recruited a platoon of contingency
fee-lawyers and- - bingo!- - Big Tobacco is on the ropes. ' 382 Corboy
wrote:
[I] consider [my] work for Cook County and its citizens a public
service and one that we have been honored to take on. State and
county legal departments, while full of able talent, do not have the
resources and experience to seek from the tobacco industry what
rightfully belongs to all of their citizens .... For me and many
others, the fight against the tobacco industry is about much more
than money, however. It's about really holding the tobacco industry
accountable for the havoc it has wreaked on our society.383
V. IMPACT: A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
The use of contingency fee contracts against the tobacco industry is
only the beginning. Private industries that are profitable, but yet un-
popular with much of the public, are now preparing themselves for the
imminent attack by Special Assistants. This scenario is what many
critics of the Special Assistants have worried about. As a result of the
enormous money at stake in future litigation, the office of the Attor-
neys General may soon become the puppets of the Special Assistants.
Since contingency fee contracts have been used in areas such as to-
bacco 384 and asbestos 385 litigation, the ultimate question is who or
what will be the next target of state sponsored litigation in the future?
Recent filings by various states, such as California, indicate that it is
the gun industry that will soon be on the defensive. 386 Another target
of the Special Assistants is HMOs. 387 Richard Scruggs, the Special
Assistant Attorney General who led the State of Mississippi in the
tobacco litigation, recently filed a suit against five HMOs on behalf of
the State of Mississippi. 388 In addition, Special Assistants using con-
tingency fee contracts have filed suits against lead paint manufacturers
in Rhode Island.389 "These lawsuits are in fact part of a disturbing
382. McCarron, supra note 255.
383. See Corboy, supra note 378.
384. See supra notes 235-256.
385. See supra notes 251, 343.
386. See Robert Suro, California Cities, Counties Sue Firearms Makers, WASH. POST, May 26,
1999, at A14.
387. See Janan Hanna, Five HMOs Face Lawsuits Charging Subpar Care; Tobacco Case Law-
yer Alleges Racketeering by Health-Care Firms, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1999, at Al.
388. Id.
389. See United States Chamber of Commerce Condemns Action Against Lead Paint Manufac-
turers (visited Dec. 2, 1999), at http://www.uschamber.com/pressroom/pressreleases/1999releases/
October+1999/99-195.html.
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trend in which plaintiff's lawyers move from one legal, but out-of-
favor, industry to the next in search of outrageous contingency fees.
These lawsuits raise the same troubling question ... who's next?" 390
The creation of the Special Assistant, armed with a list of injured
clients in one hand, and a contingency fee contract signed by the State
Attorney General in the other hand, has now become the worst
nightmare of most industries. "No industry is immune, especially
when there is the tantalizing prospect of billions of dollars in contin-
gency fees. '391
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Attorney General approaches the podium to take the
oath of the office, his role is inherently different than any attorney in
private practice. The Attorney General becomes an advocate for the
people, forced to leave behind his personal biases or influences in rep-
resenting the state. The United States Supreme Court has held that
the Attorney General "is the representative not of an ordinary
party.1392 The clients of the Attorney General seek justice and do not
expect to receive large compensation for their injuries. When a pri-
vate attorney accepts a position as a Special Assistant, he has accepted
a role consistent with the oath of office taken by the Attorney Gen-
eral. Unfortunately, it is inherently impossible for a Special Assistant,
compensated on the basis of a contingency fee contract, to uphold the
principles of impartiality and neutrality that represent the office.
The controversy of the Attorney General's authority to enter into
contingency fee contracts must be decided within each individual state
across the country. If the above cases are any indication, this contro-
versy is just beginning. Although the tobacco industry has ended its
fight with the Special Assistants, it is fairly certain that the war is far
from over. As more contingency suits are filed on behalf of the Attor-
ney General, more industries will be reluctantly pulled into this battle.
It is in the industries' best interest to keep disputing the authority of
390. U.S. Chamber Criticizes California Gun Lawsuits: 'Who's Next' in Latest campaign
Against Legal Business (visited Dec. 2, 1999), at http://www.uschamber.org/media/releases
may99/052599.html.
391. Chamber Criticizes Government Lawsuits: No Industry Immune When Trial Lawyers,
Government Hunt for Money (visited Dec. 2, 1999), at http://www.uschamber.org/media/releases/
june99/062299a.htmI; see also Ridenour, supra note 1 (stating that if Special Assistants can make
billions on tobacco, they will be encouraged to exploit the adverse health effects of liquor, sports
cars, or junk food).
392. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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the Attorneys General. Thus, we can safely assume that the new
targets of the Special Assistants will not go down without a fight.
David Edward Dahlquist
